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FUNCTIONALISM’S MILITARY NECESSITY 
PROBLEM:  EXTRATERRITORIAL 
HABEAS CORPUS, JUSTICE KENNEDY, 
BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH, AND 
AL MAQALEH V. GATES 
Richard Nicholson* 
 
The U.S. Supreme Court has struggled over the last 150 years to 
definitively answer the question of whether the U.S. Constitution applies 
beyond the borders of the territorial United States.  Because the 
Constitution is silent on the issue, the burden has fallen on the judiciary to 
establish the contours of the doctrine.  At times, the Court has espoused 
formulistic theories limiting constitutional application to territorial 
sovereignty, while at others it has looked to more objective, practical 
solutions that reach beyond the borders. 
In 2008, the Supreme Court held in Boumediene v. Bush that the 
application of the Suspension Clause of the Constitution to habeas petitions 
by detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba would turn on 
“functionalist” factors.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
ultimately concluded that the lack of adequate process, the site of detention, 
and the lack of practical obstacles weighed in favor of applying the 
Suspension Clause to the detainees’ habeas petitions.  Two years later, in 
Al Maqaleh v. Gates, a panel of the D.C. Circuit employed the Boumediene 
factors but held that they weighed against applying the Suspension Clause 
to the habeas petitions of similar detainees imprisoned at Bagram Air 
Force Base in Afghanistan. 
This Note argues that Justice Kennedy’s functionalist test sits at the 
intersection of two constitutional theories:  extraterritoriality and military 
necessity.  Utilizing Justice Kennedy’s highly subjective balancing test, the 
D.C. Circuit was able invoke the power of military necessity by focusing on 
the fact that Bagram was located in an “active theater of war.”  This 
allowed the D.C. Circuit to sidestep the obvious similarities between the 
Guantanamo and Bagram detainees and to clash with and undermine 
Boumediene.  Ultimately, this Note concludes that for Justice Kennedy’s 
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functionalism to remain viable it must purge the influence of military 
necessity and reformulate or strike the “active theater of war” language 
from its balancing test. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In October 2001, Lakhdar Boumediene was captured in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina by Bosnian authorities for his alleged involvement in a plot to 
bomb the U.S. Embassy in Sarajevo.1  Boumediene, a native Algerian, was 
legally residing in Bosnia and Herzegovina at the time of his capture and 
was held in a Bosnian prison during the investigation.2  On January 17, 
2002, Boumediene was released from Bosnian prison but was immediately 
detained by U.S. authorities and transferred to Guantanamo Bay Naval Base 
in Cuba.3  Boumediene began his detention at Guantanamo on January 20, 
2002.4  The challenges to his detention at Guantanamo ultimately led to the 
Supreme Court decision Boumediene v. Bush5 in 2008.  The Supreme Court 
found that U.S. courts had jurisdiction over Boumediene’s habeas corpus 
petition and remanded.6  In light of the Supreme Court’s holding, the 
district court reconsidered Boumediene’s habeas petition and ordered his 
release from Guantanamo, six years after his capture by the United States.7  
In 2003, Fadi Al Maqaleh, a Yemeni citizen, was taken into custody by 
U.S. forces in Zabul, Afghanistan.8  He was detained by the United States at 
the Bagram Theater Internment Facility at Bagram Airfield in Afghanistan 
and filed a habeas corpus petition relying on the Court’s decision in 
Boumediene.9  The resolution of that habeas petition led to the D.C. 
 
 1. See Boumediene v. Bush, 579 F. Supp. 2d 191, 193 (D.D.C. 2008), rev’d in part sub 
nom. Bensayah v. Obama, 610 F.3d 718 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (holding that the government had 
failed to prove that Bensayah, one of the six Boumediene defendants, supported Al Qaeda).  
The U.S. Government later conceded that this alleged plot was no longer a legitimate reason 
for detention. Id. 
 2. See id. 
 3. See id. at 194. 
 4. See id. 
 5. 553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
 6. Id. at 798. 
 7. See Boumediene, 579 F. Supp. 2d at 198–99. 
 8. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 209 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 
84 (D.C. Cir. 2010).  This was disputed by Al Maqaleh, whose petition asserted “on 
information and belief” that he was captured beyond Afghan borders; but a sworn 
declaration from Colonel James W. Gray, Commander of Detention Operations, states that 
Al Maqaleh was captured in Afghanistan. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 87 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010). 
 9. See Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 207–08. 
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Circuit’s 2010 decision in Al Maqaleh v. Gates.10  The D.C. Circuit 
distinguished Boumediene and denied Al Maqaleh’s petition for lack of 
jurisdiction.11  Al Maqaleh remains in U.S. custody and continues to 
petition federal courts for release.12 
The outcomes for the two detainees could not have been more different.  
Boumediene, in custody at Guantanamo, could access the U.S. courts and 
seek his release, while Al Maqaleh, imprisoned at Bagram, was stuck in a 
legal black hole.13  Al Maqaleh and the other detainees whose habeas 
petitions were joined in Al Maqaleh had filed a new habeas petition,14 
which demonstrated a potentially more significant concern than Al 
Maqaleh’s individual plight:  the government could, and may have already, 
exploited this legal conflict to delay justice for other detainees.15  After the 
opportunity to advance this argument, however, the district court recently 
dismissed this petition for failing to provide sufficient evidence.16 
Given that Boumediene and Al Maqaleh were decided only two years 
apart, under the same legal standard created by the Supreme Court and with 
similar factual postures, it is surprising and perhaps alarming that the cases 
had such different outcomes.  Yet, things become clearer when one delves 
into the standard under which these cases were decided.  This standard 
originated in Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Boumediene, where he 
 
 10. 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 11. See id. at 99. 
 12. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, Nos. 06-1669, 08-1307, 08-2143, 2011 WL 666883, at *2 
(D.D.C. Feb. 15, 2011) (granting leave for the petitions to amend their habeas petitions); 
Larkin Reynolds, Hearing Today in Al Maqaleh v. Rumsfeld, LAWFARE (July 16, 2012, 9:10 
AM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/07/hearing-today-in-al-maqaleh-v-rumsfeld/; Wells 
Bennett, Supplementary Declarations and Exhibits Filed in Al Maqaleh, LAWFARE (Sept. 25, 
2012, 12:43 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/09/supplementary-declarations-and-
exhibits-filed-in-al-maqaleh/. 
 13. Other articles have referred to Guantanamo Bay as a legal black hole. See, e.g., 
Ernesto Hernández-López, Guantánamo As a “Legal Black Hole”:  A Base for Expanding 
Space, Markets, and Culture, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 141, 141 (2012); Johan Steyn, Guantanamo 
Bay:  A Legal Black Hole, 53 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 1, 2 (2004). 
 14. See Joint Motion to Amend Petitions for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 1, 9, Al-Maqaleh 
v. Gates, Civil Action No. 06-1669 (JBD) (D.D.C. Sept. 1, 2010). 
 15. See Matt Apuzzo & Adam Goldman, CIA Flight Carried Secret from Gitmo, 
ASSOCIATED PRESS, available at http://www.apnewsarchive.com/2010/AP-Exclusive-CIA-
flight-carried-secret-from-Gitmo/id-c65fc861ba0f45d39cece91f1d140d19?SearchText=CIA
%20Flight%20Carried%20Secret%20from%20Gitmo;Display_ (detailing the transfer of 
detainees from Guantanamo before they could receive habeas corpus rights); Tim Golden, 
Foiling U.S. Plan, Prison Expands in Afghanistan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7, 2008, at A1 (noting 
that the Bagram population was about 100 detainees in early 2004, but increased to more 
than 500 by 2007); Tim Golden & Eric Schmitt, A Growing Afghan Prison Rivals Bleak 
Guantanamo, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2006, at A1 (attributing the shift of detainees to “a Bush 
administration decision to shut off the flow of detainees into Guantanamo,” moving 
prisoners to other detention sites specifically to avoid habeas jurisdiction); see also Margaret 
L. Satterthwaite & Angelina Fisher, Tortured Logic:  Renditions to Justice, Extraordinary 
Rendition, and Human Rights Law, 6 LONG TERM VIEW 52, 52 (2006) (“[T]he Bush 
Administration continues to employ strategies that appear to be aimed at keeping ‘War on 
Terror’ detainees outside the ambit of the U.S. legal system . . . .”). 
 16. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, Nos. 06-1669, 08-1307, 08-2143, 2012 WL 5077483, at 
*9–12 (D.D.C. Oct. 19, 2012). 
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espoused a functionalist test for the extraterritorial application of the 
Constitution.17  Unlike some other theories for the extraterritorial 
application of the Constitution, which rely on more bright-line legal rules,18 
functionalism calls for case-by-case determinations of extraterritoriality.19  
Functionalism empowers judges to balance objective and practical factors 
to determine whether or not the Constitution applies outside of the United 
States.20 
The problem with such a test, however, is evident in the seemingly 
conflicting results of the Boumediene and Al Maqaleh litigations, where 
there were two different outcomes for what appeared to be similar habeas 
petitions.  The prisoners were both foreign citizens, were both captured 
outside of the United States, and were both detained outside of the United 
States by the U.S. military.21  Yet, as Justice Kennedy has argued, the 
Supreme Court has a long history of wrestling with the application of the 
Constitution in cases that have originated outside the territorial United 
States.  These cases have been decided using a “common thread” of 
functionalist theory.22 
Whether a functionalist extraterritorial application of the Constitution is 
the “right” test is beyond the scope of this Note.  As evidenced by the 
heated five-to-four split in Boumediene, the greatest legal minds in the 
country could not agree on the “right” test.23  This Note is instead 
concerned with Justice Kennedy’s three-factor test itself, because for now, 
it is the controlling Supreme Court precedent.24  One factor is particularly 
important for the future of functionalism, because it has the potential to 
overshadow and overpower the other two.  This is the third prong of Justice 
Kennedy’s test, which calls on the court to balance “practical factors.”25   
“Practical factors” sounds benign, but this factor can free a court to 
employ another controversial and thorny issue to help decide the case—
military necessity.  Cases that turn on military necessity, like Ex Parte 
Milligan,26 Korematsu v. United States,27 and Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
 
 17. See Gerald L. Neuman, The Extraterritorial Constitution After Boumediene v. Bush, 
82 S. CAL. L. REV. 259 (2009); see also infra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. 
 18. One such bright-line rule is that the Constitution is limited by territorial 
sovereignty—the Constitution stops at the border. See infra notes 80–83 and accompanying 
text. 
 19. See infra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. 
 20. See infra notes 87–91 and accompanying text. 
 21. See supra notes 1–9 and accompanying text. 
 22. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 764 (2008) (“A constricted reading of 
Eisentrager overlooks what we see as a common thread uniting the Insular Cases, 
Eisentrager, and Reid:  the idea that questions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors 
and practical concerns, not formalism.”); see Neuman, supra note 17, at 263–64. 
 23. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 730. 
 24. See Neuman, supra note 17, at 261–62. 
 25. See infra notes 314–20 and accompanying text. 
 26. 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 4 (1866) (holding that military necessity did not warrant the 
suspension of habeas corpus for a civilian in Indiana during the American Civil War). 
 27. 323 U.S. 214, 214–15 (1944) (holding that military necessity was a justification for 
the internment of Japanese Americans during World War II). 
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Co. v. Sawyer,28 are unpredictable and have wrought unstable 
jurisprudence.  Further, the failure to adopt cohesive bright-line rules in 
these heavily split and hotly contested military necessity cases suggests a 
Court struggling to find a practical, perhaps functionalist, solution to the 
scope of individual liberties and security concerns in times of emergency. 
Ultimately, Justice Kennedy chose to side-step the military necessity 
arguments that would have supported the Government in his Boumediene 
opinion,29 but strong arguments by Justice Scalia in dissent30 and the D.C. 
Circuit in Al Maqaleh31 show that the threat of mutating the three-factor 
functionalist test into one dominated by military necessity is real.  For the 
functionalist test envisioned by Justice Kennedy to survive, it must change 
to avoid being twisted into something else entirely. 
This Note is organized in four parts.  Part I serves as a primer on the 
historical and technical aspects of the writ of habeas corpus.  It also 
provides the theoretical foundations that inform the current debate over 
extraterritoriality and military necessity.  To further solidify this 
framework, Part II provides a historical narrative of the Supreme Court’s 
extraterritoriality and military necessity jurisprudence.  Part III summarizes 
the postures of the Boumediene and Al Maqaleh litigations, and briefly 
explains the route that these two litigations took through the federal courts.  
The bulk of Part III analyzes the reasoning used by the judges and 
Justices—controlling as well as concurring and dissenting opinions—who 
have weighed in on the Boumediene and Al Maqaleh decisions.  Part IV 
argues that, by overemphasizing military necessity for habeas corpus 
availability in Al Maqaleh, the D.C. Circuit undermined Boumediene and 
characterizes the decision as a symptom of Boumediene’s easily 
manipulated three-factor balancing test.  Thus, this Note recommends a new 
test that moves the focus away from the current formulation of “practical 
concerns” and advocates for a new factor:  the abuse or avoidance of 
process. 
I.  HABEAS CORPUS, EXTRATERRITORIALITY, AND MILITARY NECESSITY:  
A PREFACE TO FUNCTIONALISM 
Part I describes the procedural nature of the writ of habeas corpus and 
provides a brief explanation of its origins in the United States.  It details the 
modern history of habeas corpus jurisdiction pertaining to “enemy 
combatant” detainees, particularly the effect of the Military Commission 
 
 28. 343 U.S. 579, 579–80 (1952) (holding that military necessity was not a justification 
for the seizure of U.S. steel mills by the Secretary of Commerce during the Korean War). 
 29. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 769 (2008) (“The Government presents no 
credible arguments that the military mission at Guantanamo would be compromised if 
habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees’ claims.”). 
 30. See id. at 827–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The game of bait-and-switch that today’s 
opinion plays upon the Nation’s Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us.”). 
 31. See 605 F.3d 84, 97 (D.C. Cir 2010). 
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Act of 200632 (MCA) and Detainee Treatment Act of 200533 (DTA) on 28 
U.S.C. § 2241.  Lastly, it addresses the two primary legal theories that 
intersect in Justice Kennedy’s functionalism:  extraterritoriality and military 
necessity.  These two legal theories are recurring themes in the 
jurisprudence that comprises Parts II and III. 
A.  The Writ of Habeas Corpus 
A writ is a written court order that requires an authority to carry out or 
refrain from committing some act.34  The most literal meaning of habeas 
corpus comes from its Latin translation, which is “that you have the 
body.”35  Thus, at its most basic, the writ of habeas corpus is a court order 
related to some act having to do with the physical custody of the body of a 
person.  This simple definition is not far off from the more sophisticated 
legal meaning of “[a] writ employed to bring a person before a court, most 
frequently to ensure that the person’s imprisonment or detention is not 
illegal.”36   
While this definition seems sufficiently straightforward, there are some 
important underlying procedural points.  First, the writ of habeas corpus is a 
collateral challenge to a person’s imprisonment and only seeks to achieve a 
judicial hearing on the legality of the imprisoner’s actions.37  Thus, when a 
judge considers a petitioner’s writ, he or she does not make a determination 
of the merits of the prisoner’s crimes (i.e., the prisoner’s guilt or 
innocence).38  Second, if the court finds that there was no legal basis for the 
petitioner’s imprisonment, the writ will issue and the remedy is release.39 
The true power of the writ of habeas corpus becomes clearer when one 
considers what it seeks to prevent.  Alexander Hamilton wrote that “the 
practice of arbitrary imprisonments, have been, in all ages, the favorite and 
most formidable instruments of tyranny.”40  Thus, it should come as no 
surprise that many of the great political and legal minds of both the 
 
 32. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 
28, and 42 U.S.C.). 
 33. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241). 
 34. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1747 (9th ed. 2009). 
 35. Id. at 778. 
 36. Id. 
 37. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 745 (2008) (noting that habeas corpus 
“protects the rights of the detained by affirming the duty and authority of the Judiciary to call 
the jailer to account”); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 494–95 
(1973) (“The writ of habeas corpus does not act upon the prisoner who seeks relief, but upon 
the person who holds him in what is alleged to be unlawful custody.” (citing Wales v. 
Whitney, 114 U.S. 564, 574 (1885))). 
 38. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 8 (1946). 
 39. See Wales, 114 U.S. at 571 (“[The] purpose [of the writ] is to enable the court to 
inquire, first, if the petitioner is restrained of his liberty.  If he is not, the court can do 
nothing but discharge the writ.  If there is such restraint, the court can then inquire into the 
cause of it, and if the alleged cause be unlawful it must then discharge the prisoner.”). 
 40. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed., 1898). 
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English41 and American42 tradition have written about the writ’s essential 
place as a protection of individual rights. 
The framers’ exaltation of the writ of habeas corpus was more than just 
empty praise.  First, a prohibition against the suspension of the writ of 
habeas corpus was immortalized in the Constitution.43  Second, the first 
Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, which granted the federal 
courts the power to grant writs of habeas corpus.44  This early commitment 
to the writ, both constitutionally and statutorily, helped create a tradition of 
viewing the right as more than just a procedural tool and reflected a new 
nation’s commitment to the protection of individual rights.45 
This tradition has been carried through to today, with the successor to the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 residing in 28 U.S.C. § 2241.46  This section holds 
that federal courts may issue writs of habeas corpus but only “within their 
respective jurisdictions.”47  The meaning of “jurisdiction” has been 
interpreted to mean that the court issuing the writ must be able to serve 
process on the custodian—it is not tied to the location of the prisoner.48  
Thus, a prisoner can be confined outside the court’s territorial jurisdiction, 
and the court will still be able to issue a writ of habeas corpus regarding the 
imprisonment, as long as the custodian can be reached.49  The statute does 
limit the type of prisoner who can seek the writ, requiring an adequate 
 
 41. For an extensive history of the development of the English common law writ of 
habeas corpus, see R.J. SHARPE, THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS 1–18 (2d ed. 1989) and Paul 
D. Halliday & G. Edward White, The Suspension Clause:  English Text, Imperial Contexts, 
and American Implications, 94 VA. L. REV. 575 (2008). 
 42. See Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), in 8 THE WRITING OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON 1, 4–5 (Paul Leicester Ford ed., 1897) (noting that the protection of 
habeas corpus was an essential principle of government); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 83, 
supra note 40, at 468 (Alexander Hamilton) (recognizing that habeas corpus is a “bulwark” 
against arbitrary government (quoting 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *131, 
available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/blackstone_bk1ch1.asp)). 
 43. This clause is known as the “Suspension Clause.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The 
Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). See generally Amanda Tyler, The 
Forgotten Core Meaning of the Suspension Clause, 125 HARV. L. REV. 901, 1000–01 (2012) 
(arguing that the founding generation’s understanding of the Suspension Clause is likely at 
odds with many of the modern day habeas corpus decisions). 
 44. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
(2006)); see also INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 305 (2001) (“Federal courts have been 
authorized to issue writs of habeas corpus since the enactment of the Judiciary Act of 1789 
. . . .”). 
 45. See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 401–02 (1963) (“Although in form the Great Writ is 
simply a mode of procedure, its history is inextricably intertwined with the growth of 
fundamental rights of personal liberty.”). 
 46. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241 (2006). 
 47. Id. § 2241(a). 
 48. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U.S. 484, 495 (1973).  It is 
worth noting that Congress maintains the power to govern the federal judiciary’s ability to 
hear habeas corpus petitions so long as it does not violate the Constitution. See Lonchar v. 
Thomas, 517 U.S. 314, 323 (1996) (noting that the scope of habeas corpus statute is for 
Congress to make). 
 49. Braden, 410 U.S. at 495. 
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connection between the prisoner, the custodian, and the United States.50  
This idea of an adequate connection was put to the test with the wave of 
cases that resulted from the War on Terror, during which the American 
military captured suspected terrorists and held them abroad. 
B.  Modern Habeas Corpus and the War on Terror:  
Rasul v. Bush, the DTA and the MCA 
The unprecedented terrorist attack on September 11, 2001, led to an 
immediate legal response by the U.S. government.  Just a few days after 
September 11, on September 18, Congress passed the Authorization for Use 
of Military Force (AUMF).51  The AUMF empowers the President to use 
“all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or 
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks . . . or harbored such organizations or persons.”52  Since September 
11, the United States has engaged in conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
while maintaining military operations across the globe in order to fight the 
Global War on Terror.  Beyond serving as the authorization for combat in 
Afghanistan, the AUMF also served as justification for the Bush 
Administration’s,53 and later the Obama Administration’s, policy of 
indefinite detention.54 
The Supreme Court has responded to these extraordinary times with 
several opinions weighing in on the legality, nature, and policy of indefinite 
detention.  In two cases decided on June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court 
evaluated the scope of the AUMF and the indefinite detention policies 
adopted by the Bush Administration, which had claimed that the practice 
was “necessary and appropriate force” used in the War on Terror.55  In 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,56 the Court held that indefinite detentions were 
authorized under the AUMF.57  In Rasul v. Bush,58 the Court granted the 
 
 50. See 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c). 
 51. Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (2006)). 
 52. Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004) (alteration in original) (quoting §§ 1–2, 115 
Stat. at 224). 
 53. Id. at 471–74; see FREDERICK A.O. SCHWARZ JR. & AZIZ Z. HUQ, UNCHECKED AND 
UNBALANCED:  PRESIDENTIAL POWER IN A TIME OF TERROR 142 (2007); Alan W. Clarke, De-
cloaking Torture:  Boumediene and the Military Commissions Act, 11 SAN DIEGO INT’L L.J. 
59, 78–88 (2009); Marc. D. Falkoff, Back to Basics:  Habeas Corpus Procedures and Long-
Term Executive Detention, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 961, 993–95 (2009). 
 54. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Robert M. Chesney, 
Who May Be Held?  Military Detention Through the Habeas Lens, 52 B.C. L. REV. 769, 789 
(2011); Judith Resnik, Detention, the War on Terror, and the Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. 
L. REV. 579, 623–629 & 624 n.172 (2010). 
 55. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518–19 
(2004). 
 56. 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
 57. Petitioner Hamdi’s argument was that his indefinite detention violated 18 U.S.C 
§ 4001(a) (2006). See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 517–18, 520.  Section 4001(a) provides that “[n]o 
citizen shall be imprisoned or otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an 
Act of Congress.”  The Court held that the AUMF was sufficient to satisfy the statutory 
requirement of an “Act of Congress” and that, as long as hostilities were ongoing, the 
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request for habeas corpus challenges by detainees being held at 
Guantanamo Bay.59 
In response to Rasul, Congress passed the DTA in 2005.60  The Act 
covers many matters relating to the treatment of detainees in U.S. custody, 
including the introduction of a new process to review the status of detainees 
called a Combatant Status Review Tribunal (CRST).61  The statute also 
attempted to amend § 224162 by stripping Article III courts of jurisdiction 
to hear habeas corpus petitions from detainees at Guantanamo Bay.63  The 
DTA prevented any “court, justice or judge” from having jurisdiction over 
an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed on behalf of Guantanamo 
detainees.64  The DTA also carved out a role for the D.C. Circuit to review 
the determinations of the CRST, but only to determine if the military 
followed the DTA in determining the status of the detainee.65  Whether this 
collateral review was constitutionally sufficient compared to a more 
searching, habeas corpus review was a contested debate among the Justices 
and was a major element of the Supreme Court’s Boumediene decision.66 
In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,67 the Court held that while the DTA may have 
stripped the Court of the ability to review habeas petitions filed after the 
passage of the DTA, it still retained jurisdiction over ones that were 
pending at the time of the DTA’s enactment.68  Just as in Rasul, Congress 
responded quickly and four months later passed the MCA.69  In addition to 
enacting a complex system of military tribunals for War on Terror 
detainees, the MCA explicitly forbade Article III courts from hearing the 
habeas petitions of detainees who had been deemed enemy combatants after 
 
government was empowered to hold Hamdi as long as necessary. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 
518.  The Court offered an important caveat, however, noting that the military necessity that 
served as the rationale for the detentions could “unravel” as the nature of the conflict 
changed. Id. at 521. 
 58. 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
 59. Id. at 485. 
 60. Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 2241). 
 61. Id. § 1005(a), 119 Stat. at 2741–42.  For a thorough review of how and why the 
CRST was developed, see JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF 
PRESIDENTIAL POWER 159–70 (2006). 
 62. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
 63. § 1005(e), 119 Stat. at 2741–42; see Janet Cooper Alexander, Jurisdiction-Stripping 
in a Time of Terror, 95. CALIF. L. REV. 1193, 1194 (2007). 
 64. § 1005(e), 119 Stat. at 2741–42. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Compare Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008), with id. at 808 (Roberts, 
C.J., dissenting).  Some scholars have been critical of the DTA and MCA. See, e.g., Richard 
H. Fallon, Jr. & Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the 
War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2063 (2007) (“Whatever the contemporary reach of 
the Suspension Clause as construed in St. Cyr, we believe that the total preclusion of review 
in the DTA and MCA is unconstitutional . . . .”). 
 67. 548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
 68. Id. at 584–85. 
 69. Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (2006) (codified in scattered sections of 10, 18, 
28 and 42 U.S.C.). 
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September 11, 2001.70  Thus, the MCA removed all ambiguity about 
Congress’s intent to deny enemy combatants habeas corpus rights via the 
statute, and the only recourse would be a constitutional challenge to the 
MCA and DTA. 
This conflict between the Supreme Court and the political branches 
serves as a backdrop to, and ultimately spawned, the Boumediene and the 
subsequent Al Maqaleh litigation.  An analysis of these two cases is 
conducted in Part III of this Note.  Before getting there, however, the 
following section analyzes the legal theories that formed the foundation of 
the extraterritorial habeas corpus debate. 
C.  Two Legal Theories That Intersect in Justice Kennedy’s Functionalism 
The functionalist holding of Boumediene, which allows a court to balance 
the “practical factors” that may inhibit the government from reasonably 
hearing habeas petitions, sits at a theoretical crossroads between 
extraterritoriality and military necessity.  At first glance, these two theories 
treat different problems.  Extraterritoriality theory grapples with the 
application of constitutional rights outside the United States, and military 
necessity theory deals with the scope of the government’s power to limit 
individual liberties in times of emergency.71  Yet, the two theories do share 
important similarities.  First, both theories try to solve important legal 
questions about which the Constitution is largely silent.72  This 
constitutional silence has left the shaping of the debate to scholars and 
judges.73  Second, while these theories can be often characterized by the 
polarized views of the debate, discussion has moved toward a murkier, but 
more operational, middle view.74  While the concept of functionalism has 
been predominantly associated with extraterritoriality, the development of 
the military necessity law also suggests a move toward functional, practical 
theory.75  Those similarities aside, the third factor in Justice Kennedy’s 
Boumediene opinion provides a more formalized relationship for the two 
theories, and that relationship is the most important one addressed in Part II 
and Part III of this Note. 
1.  The Theory of Extraterritoriality 
At its simplest, the theory of extraterritoriality considers whether the 
Constitution has force beyond the territorial limits of the United States.76  
The Constitution itself offers little guidance on this question.77  Thus, it is 
 
 70. See Alexander, supra note 63, at 1197, 1201–11. 
 71. See infra notes 76, 92 and accompanying text. 
 72. See infra notes 76, 77, 92–98 and accompanying text.  
 73. See generally infra note 102 and accompanying text. 
 74. See generally infra Part I.C.1–2. 
 75. See discussion infra Part II.B.3. 
 76. See José A. Cabranes, Our Imperial Criminal Procedure:  Problems in the 
Extraterritorial Application of U.S. Constitutional Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1660, 1664 (2009). 
 77. Id. at 1662. 
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no surprise that there is a lack of consensus among scholars and the courts 
on “[w]hether constitutional provisions have force beyond the borders of 
the United States—that is, whether they have ‘extraterritorial’ 
application.”78  While much has been written about extraterritoriality,79 this 
scholarship is mostly beyond the scope of this Note.  This section merely 
aims to clarify the basic theories which serve as a foundation for the later 
jurisprudence that comprises the extraterritorial habeas debate. 
The most basic and traditional theory of extraterritoriality is that the 
Constitution does not travel beyond the borders of the United States.80  The 
rationales for this view vary among scholars, ranging from interpretations 
of the Constitution’s text and original intent81 to more theoretical arguments 
about the exclusive relationship between the government and the 
governed.82  Regardless of the reasoning, the effect is largely the same—the 
U.S. Constitution applies only within the borders of the fifty states and to 
U.S. citizens.83 
A more recent theory takes the contrary view and argues that rights-
granting constitutional provisions have no express limitations as to where or 
to whom they apply.84  This theory views the Constitution as the ultimate 
source of the government’s power and, regardless of the person on the other 
end of the government’s action, it is nonetheless constrained by the 
document that empowers it.85  The effect here is murkier than in the 
 
 78. See id. at 1664. 
 79. See, e.g., Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution?  Extraterritoriality 
After Boumediene, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1042–43 (2009) (arguing for a more 
consequentialist approach to extraterritoriality that looks to the Fourteenth Amendment 
incorporation doctrine as a model); Cabranes, supra note 76, at 1664 (arguing for a more 
functionalist application of a global Constitution focusing on a case by case application of 
specific provisions of the Constitution to extraterritorial cases); Sarah H. Cleveland, 
Embedded International Law and the Constitution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 225, 286–87 
(2010) (arguing that modern extraterritoriality doctrines intersects with international law); 
J. Andrew Kent, A Textual and Historical Case Against a Global Constitution, 95 GEO. L.J. 
463, 467–72 (2007) (noting the debate around extraterritoriality and siding against 
application outside the territorial United States based on textual and originalist arguments); 
Jules Lobel, Fundamental Norms, International Law, and the Extraterritorial Constitution, 
36 YALE J. INT’L L. 307, 359 (2011) (arguing that extraterritoriality should be shaped by an 
international law fundamental norms approach); Gerald L. Neuman, Whose Constitution?, 
100 YALE L.J. 909 (1991) (noting the debate and arguing against a “global constitution” in 
favor of a more limited “municipal rights” model of constitutional application). 
 80. See Kent, supra note 79, at 538. 
 81. See id. 
 82. See Cabranes, supra note 76, at 1665–67 (calling this the “compact” theory of the 
Constitution); Neuman, supra note 79, at 917–19 (distinguishing between a “membership” 
model, which would have the Constitution apply to citizens, and a “municipal law” model, 
which would have the Constitution track to the jurisdiction of the nation). 
 83. See Cabranes, supra note 76, at 1667 (“Under the compact theory, the procedural 
safeguards set forth in the Constitution . . . have no force abroad.”); Neuman, supra note 79, 
at 918 (“If the Constitution is viewed as itself a ‘law’ or legal norm, then the territorialist 
would conclude that the Constitution has power to bind only within the nation’s borders.”). 
 84. See Cabranes, supra note 76, at 1667; Neuman, supra note 79, at 916. 
 85. See Cabranes, supra note 76, at 1667; Neuman, supra note 79, at 916.  An eloquent 
expression of this theory was expressed by Justice Black:  “The United States is entirely a 
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territorial limitation argument because there are some aspects of 
constitutional law that cannot be lifted out of their domestic contexts and be 
applied elsewhere—say, in active military combat.86  This problem leads to 
a third, hybrid approach to the application of extraterritorial constitutional 
rights. 
This third way to solve the extraterritoriality problem is a more 
functional approach, which tries to allow judges to balance competing 
factors for and against application of the Constitution in the specific cases 
that come before them.87  It is this form of extraterritorial application of 
constitutional rights that took root in Boumediene.88  This view seeks to 
weigh the nature of the constitutional power to be applied, the relationship 
between the United States and the person seeking protection, the risk of 
injustice, and the practical limitations.89  Yet, this balancing is not without 
flaw because the judge doing the balancing can impose his or her own 
predilections and understanding of the judiciary’s role to shape the holding 
as he or she sees fit.90  Thus, a judge can be as narrow, intrusive, or 
deferential as he or she desires.91  It also serves as the bridge to the theory 
of military necessity, which follows in the next section. 
2.  Military Necessity Theory 
The scope of the government’s power, particularly the President’s, to 
bypass constitutional provisions in emergencies and military conflicts is 
ambiguous.92  The Constitution mostly focuses on the role of Congress and 
 
creature of the Constitution.  Its power and authority have no other source.  It can only act in 
accordance with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 
5–6 (1957) (citations omitted). 
 86. See Cabranes, supra note 76, at 1670–71 (explaining that a Miranda regime could 
not apply on the battlefield in the midst of house to house combat). 
 87. Id. at 1698; Neuman, supra note 79, at 919. 
 88. See Neuman, supra note 17, at 261 (“The Court rejects formalistic reliance on single 
factors, such as nationality or location, as a basis for wholesale denial of rights, and 
essentially maintains that functionalism has long been its standard methodology for deciding 
such questions.”); see also supra Part III.A.1 (describing Justice Kennedy’s functionalist test 
in Boumediene). 
 89. See Cabranes, supra note 76, at 1698. 
 90. See Neuman, supra note 79, at 919–20. 
 91. See id. 
 92. See, e.g., William G. Howell, Wartime Judgments of Presidential Power:  Striking 
Down but Not Back, 93 MINN. L. REV. 1778, 1786 (2009) (“The Constitution, after all, says 
precious little about what presidents can do when the life of the nation is imperiled.”); Gary 
Lawson, Ordinary Powers in Extraordinary Times:  Common Sense in Times of Crisis, 87 
B.U. L. REV. 289, 291 (2007) (“The Constitution deals with extraordinary times primarily 
through ordinary powers.”).  There is even a debate about how to name this legal 
phenomenon. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 76 (1947) 
(calling this the “constitutional law of war”); Lee Epstein et al., The Supreme Court During 
Crisis:  How War Affects Only Non-war Cases, 80 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 1 (2005) (calling this 
“crisis jurisprudence”); Joel R. Paul, The Geopolitical Constitution:  Executive Expediency 
and Executive Agreements, 86 CALIF. L. REV. 671, 673–74 (1998) (calling this the “discourse 
of executive expediency”); Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Originalism and 
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positively enumerates several powers, including the right to declare war,93 
to raise and support armies94 and navies,95 and to make rules and 
regulations for the government of land and naval forces.96  Yet, the 
document makes precious few references to the procedure and function of 
the government when the ordinary functioning of government is 
threatened.97  The only reference to the possible removal of constitutional 
protections during extraordinary times when “the public Safety may require 
it” is in the Suspension Clause.98  One limited reference buried in the 
enumerated powers of Congress, however, does not afford much guidance 
to a President or Congress when in need of quick decisions in extraordinary 
times of great pressure. 
Just because the text of the Constitution remains mostly silent on the 
issue does not mean that the Framers did not anticipate the legal problems 
posed by emergency situations.  Alexander Hamilton wrote in The 
Federalist No. 8 that “[i]t is the nature of war to increase the Executive, at 
the expense of the Legislative authority.”99  Madison further argued in 
Helvidius No. 4 that “[w]ar is in fact the true nurse of executive 
aggrandizement.”100  Hamilton, a Federalist who believed in a strong 
president and federal government, and Madison, a Democratic-Republican 
who believed in states’ rights and a weakened executive, obviously 
disagreed on whether this increase of presidential authority was politically 
desirable; but as to its potential existence, they agreed.101 
Given the dearth of legal guideposts in the Constitution and considered 
by the Framers, much of the debate around military necessity in 
constitutional adjudication is necessarily grounded in theoretical and 
 
Emergencies:  A Reply to Lawson, 87 B.U. L. REV. 313, 313 (2007) (calling this the “judicial 
deference thesis”). 
 93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 94. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 95. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. 
 96. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. 
 97. See Howell, supra note 92, at 1787; Lawson, supra note 92, at 291. 
 98. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.  It is also worth noting that “[t]his provision, though, is 
found in Article I, not Article II—and hence grants wartime power to Congress rather than 
the President.” Howell, supra note 92, at 1787.  Howell finds three possible constitutional 
rationales for Presidents exercising expansive powers during war:  (1) the designation of 
commander in chief, (2) the executive power via the Vesting Clause, and (3) the Take-Care 
Clause. Id. at 1787–88; see also U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (Vesting Clause); id. art. II, 
§ 2, cl. 1 (Commander-in-Chief Clause); art. II, § 2, id. § 3 (Take-Care Clause).  Howell 
argues that the Take-Care clause is the best rationale for executive power beyond what is 
found in the Constitution, noting that while laws passed by Congress must distinguish war 
and peace, “the clause . . . bestows upon presidents unique opportunities to exercise power 
during periods of war.” Howell, supra note 92, at 1789; see also Amanda Tyler, Suspension 
As an Emergency Power, 118 YALE L.J. 600, 606–07 (2009) (arguing that while the 
suspension power is “a truly stupendous emergency power,” separation of powers principles 
dictate that the power is truly “a last resort measure”). 
 99. THE FEDERALIST NO. 8, supra note 40, at 45 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 100. JAMES MADISON, HELVIDIUS NUMBER IV (1793), available at http://press-
pubs.uchicago.edu/founders/documents/a2_2_2-3s15.html. 
 101. See Howell, supra note 92, at 1783. 
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philosophical arguments in academic work and case law.  These works 
generally center on answering two distinct questions.  First, what is the 
scope of the executive and legislative branches’ power in military 
emergencies or crises?102  Second, what is the Supreme Court’s role in 
upholding individual rights in these emergencies or, conversely, what level 
of deference is due to the political branches in adjudicating the rights of 
those affected by emergency policies?103  The answer to the second 
question will depend on the answer to the first.  When answering the first 
question, legal scholars and jurists generally fall between two types of 
theoretical categories:  executive unilateralists or civil libertarians.104 
An executive unilateralist takes an expansive view of the authority 
granted to the President in times when the public safety is threatened.105  
The rationale goes that the executive branch is the more efficient and 
effective branch in dealing with national security issues, and thus 
“unilateral executive discretion, not subject to oversight from other 
institutions, is required” for successful administration of the laws in times 
 
 102. See Samuel Issacharoff & Richard H. Pildes, Between Civil Libertarianism and 
Executive Unilateralism:  An Institutional Process Approach to Rights During Wartime, 5 
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 1, 5–6 (2004).  This question has been the subject of great 
scholarly debate by some of the preeminent legal minds of the twentieth century. See David 
J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—Framing the 
Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 699–700 & 699 
n.20 (2008) (noting “the ultimate question of law on this subject:  Whom does the 
Constitution authorize to commit United States troops to military hostilities?” (quoting Peter 
M. Shane, Learning McNarama’s Lessons:  How War Powers Resolution Advances the Rule 
of Law, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1281, 1281 (1997))). See generally EDWARD S. CORWIN, 
THE PRESIDENT:  OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984, at 262–97 (5th ed. 1984); JOHN HART 
ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY:  CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS 
AFTERMATH 1–10, 47–67 (1993); HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY 
CONSTITUTION:  SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR 67–100 (1990); CLINTON 
ROSSITER, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 1–59 (1956); ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., THE 
IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 1–67 (1st ed. 1973).  This question assumes the answer to another—
what is an emergency?  While the answer to that question can be just as complex as the one 
posed after it, the simplest answer would be a war or, to be more general, a crisis that 
threatens heightened risk to the physical safety of citizens. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra, 
at 4.  For scholarship on the complexity of defining “war,” see generally Laurie R. Blank, A 
Square Peg in a Round Hole:  Stretching Law of War Detention Too Far, 63 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 1169 (2011) (analyzing “war” detention); Colonel Fred K. Ford, Keeping Boumediene 
off the Battlefield:  Examining Potential Implications of the Boumediene v. Bush Decision to 
the Conduct of United States Military Operations, 30 PACE L. REV. 396, 403–04 (arguing 
that the Court’s War on Terror jurisprudence blurs the line between the traditional military 
and “a de facto law enforcement organization”). 
 103. See Howell, supra note 92, at 1779–81. See generally David J. Barron & Martin S. 
Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 
HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008) (providing a thorough history of many of the conflicts between 
the Supreme Court and the President regarding executive war powers). 
 104. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 4. 
 105. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT:  THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME 
OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 70, 158 (2006) (arguing that “law of necessity” trumps the law of 
the Constitution).  This expansive view is also one advanced by presidential administrations; 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Attorney General observed during World War II that “the 
Constitution has never greatly bothered any wartime President.” FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF 
AUTHORITY 219 (1962). 
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of crisis.106  Obviously, given that executive unilateralists believe that the 
President is beyond judicial scrutiny, or at least should be afforded the 
broadest discretion in times of crisis, this group believes that the Court’s 
role is strictly limited in times of military necessity and crisis.107  This view 
of a severely constrained Court is not limited to academia and has also been 
espoused by former Chief Justice William Rehnquist.108 
Conversely, civil libertarians take a more rights-based approach, termed 
the “Business as Usual” model.109  Ideally, this view would hold that, “a 
state of emergency does not justify a deviation from the ‘normal’ legal 
system,”110 and that “[t]he ordinary legal system already provides the 
necessary answers to any crisis without the legislative or executive 
assertion of new or additional governmental powers.”111  This view 
necessarily acknowledges that “shifts in the institutional frameworks and 
substantive rules of liberty/security tradeoffs do, indeed, regularly take 
place during times of serious security threats.”112  This view sees the courts 
as a bulwark against the encroachment of the political branches on the 
individual liberties of Americans and would have the judiciary resist the 
temptation to defer to its companion branches.113 
Given that the positions of the executive unilateralists and the civil 
libertarians are polar opposites, it would be hard to place the reasoning used 
in any Court decision firmly in either group.  Yet, these two views mark the 
outer bounds of the military necessity doctrine.  A third view concludes that 
the Court “has been, on the whole, more complex” and focused on a 
“process-based, institutionally-oriented (as opposed to rights-oriented) 
framework for examining the legality of governmental action in extreme 
security contexts.”114  This approach sees a balance between judicial 
intervention and deference to the political branches, where the Court tries to 
 
 106. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 4. 
 107. See id. at 7. 
 108. See WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE:  CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 
205 (2000) (“Judicial inquiry, with its restrictive rules of evidence, orientation towards 
resolution of factual disputes in individual cases, and long delays, is ill-suited to determine 
an issue such as ‘military necessity.’”); see also Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 
245 (1944) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (cautioning that military judgment is not “susceptible of 
intelligent judicial appraisal”). 
 109. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 4; see also, e.g., Oren Gross, Chaos and 
Rules:  Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 
1043 (2003). 
 110. Gross, supra note 109, at 1043. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 4. 
 113. See id. at 4–6. 
 114. Id. at 5; see, e.g., Dawinder S. Sidhu, Shadowing the Flag:  Extending the Habeas 
Writ Beyond Guantánamo, 20 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 39, 79 (2011) (“The law adjusts in 
times of war—it may speak with a ‘different voice,’ but it is not silent.” (quoting 
REHNQUIST, supra note 108, at 225)). 
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assure that the political branches are acting in unison rather than explicitly 
walking the fine line between security and private rights.115 
II.  THE FOUNDATIONS OF FUNCTIONALISM IN THE SUPREME COURT’S 
EXTRATERRITORIALITY AND MILITARY NECESSITY JURISPRUDENCE 
Part I introduced the historical, statutory, and theoretical underpinnings 
of functionalism and the current extraterritorial habeas corpus debate, but it 
did not give the complete picture.  While functionalism is a fairly new 
concept, its roots reach back through a series of Supreme Court cases 
decided over the last century.116  Part II contains a historical progression of 
both the Court’s extraterritoriality and military necessity jurisprudence 
leading up to Boumediene and Al Maqaleh.  
A.  The Extraterritoriality Cases 
In developing his functionalist jurisprudence,117 Justice Kennedy has 
looked back to opinions in the Insular Cases,118 Johnson v. Eisentrager,119 
Reid v. Covert,120 and his concurrences in United States v. Verdugo-
Urquidez121 and Rasul.  These cases presented new legal issues that were 
hotly contested at the time they were decided and are comprised of several 
concurring and dissenting opinions.  Yet, as mentioned in Part I.C, no clear 
extraterritoriality doctrine has developed.122 
1.  The Insular Cases 
The earliest roots of functionalism arose around the turn of the twentieth 
century, when the Supreme Court decided a group of cases that has been 
 
 115. See Epstein, supra note 92, at 9 (“[A]t the theoretical level, we posit that the 
Supreme Court decides cases most related to war from an institutional-process perspective 
rather than from a first-order balancing of security and liberty rights.”); Richard H. Fallon, 
Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror:  An Essay on Law and 
Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 396 (2010) (arguing that the process oriented 
approach is consistent with political science principles); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 
102, at 5 (“Through this process-based approach, American courts have sought to the shift 
responsibility of these difficult decisions away from themselves and toward the joint action 
of the most democratic branches of government.”); Joseph Landau, Muscular Procedure:  
Conditional Deference in the Executive Detention Cases, 84 WASH. L. REV. 661, 666, 698–
704 (2009) (arguing that courts operate through a process-oriented approach when they insist 
on procedural regularity in national security cases). But see Howell, supra note 92, at 1792 
(“Crisis jurisprudence thereby puts Justices into the business of assessing the size and 
imminence of foreign threats, and of gauging the extent to which presidential polices 
effectively address them.”); Tom S. Clark, Judicial Decision Making During Wartime, 3 J. 
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 397, 415 (2006) (arguing that there is no evidence of heightened 
judicial deference during war time). 
 116. See Neuman, supra note 17, at 264. 
 117. See id. at 263–64. 
 118. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 119. 339 U.S. 763 (1950). 
 120. 354 U.S. 1 (1957). 
 121. 494 U.S. 259 (1990). 
 122. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text. 
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subsequently dubbed the Insular Cases by legal scholars.123  These cases 
were a result of the Spanish-American War and the colonial possessions the 
United States acquired—namely Puerto Rico, the Philippines, and Guam.124  
While these cases were not the Supreme Court’s first attempt at solidifying 
extraterritorial theory,125 these represent the Court’s early development of a 
forward-looking legal doctrine for extraterritorial jurisprudence.126 
Downes v. Bidwell,127 one of the earlier Insular Cases, is probably the 
most important case in the series128 because the divided Court set out the 
legal positions that would compete throughout the evolution of the 
doctrine.129  Justice Brown, writing for the majority, held that the provision 
of the Constitution that establishes “all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be 
uniform throughout the United States”130 does not apply to Puerto Rico.131  
The majority concluded that while Puerto Rico was a U.S. territory and 
entitled to what the Court fashioned as “natural rights,”132 it was still 
foreign enough to be excluded from the “artificial or remedial rights, which 
are ‘peculiar’” to the U.S. system of jurisprudence.133 
 
 123. See Juan Torruella, The Insular Cases:  The Establishment of a Regime of Political 
Apartheid, 77 U.P.R. L. REV. 1, 2–3 (2008). 
 124. See Christina Duffy Burnett, “They Say I Am Not an American . . .”:  The Noncitizen 
National and the Law of American Empire, 48 VA. J. INT’L L. 659, 663 (2008); Cabranes, 
supra note 76, at 1685; Torruella, supra note 123, at 2.  There are approximately twenty-five 
decisions issued by the Supreme Court between 1901 and 1922 that have been classified as 
the Insular Cases or direct descendants of those cases, but only a handful reached 
constitutional issues. See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (holding that the 
right for trial by jury did not extend to citizens living in Puerto Rico); Rassmussen v. United 
States, 197 U.S. 516 (1905) (holding that the right for trial by jury did extend to citizens 
living in Alaska); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904) (holding that the right for trial 
by jury did not extend to citizen living in the Philippines); Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 
(1903) (holding that the right for trial by jury did not apply to Hawaii); Dooley v. United 
States, 183 U.S. 151 (1901) (holding that trade with Puerto Rico fell under the Export Clause 
of the Constitution rather than trade within the United States); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 
244 (1901) (holding that trade with Puerto Rico did not fall under the Uniformity Clause for 
the regulation of imports). 
 125. See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (holding that a sailor who was convicted by an 
American consular tribunal in Japan for a murder committed while docked there was not 
entitled to constitutional procedural protections because the Constitution only applied within 
the United States); Am. Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828) (holding that judicial 
power could be vested in non-Article III courts sitting in Florida while it was still a territory 
because Congress was empowered by the Constitution to govern territories). 
 126. See Cabranes, supra note 76, at 1685–87. 
 127. 182 U.S. 244 (1901). 
 128. See Cabranes, supra note 76, at 1685. 
 129. See id. at 1685–87. 
 130. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 131. Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 287. 
 132. Id. at 282 (explaining that rights like freedom of speech, freedom of religion, and 
due process of law extend to the territories). 
 133. Id. at 282–83 (explaining that rights like citizenship, suffrage, and particular 
procedural mechanisms are unique to the Anglo-Saxon method of jurisprudence and are 
“unnecessary” for the protection of individuals). 
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Justice White’s concurring opinion, which would have significance in 
later Insular Cases,134 was similar to the one espoused by the majority.  But 
instead of focusing on “natural” and “artificial” rights, Justice White sought 
to create one threshold question to determine whether constitutional rights 
should apply abroad—was the territory “incorporated” into the United 
States?135  This question of “incorporation” turned on the “situation of the 
territory and its relations to the United States.”136  Justice White concluded 
that in this case, for the sake of the uniformity of imports provision, Puerto 
Rico was not incorporated.137  In dissent, Justice Fuller rebuked the 
majority’s holding and argued that it would create territories that existed in 
a gray area of constitutional law.138 
The doctrinal battle that began in Bidwell settled and reached its 
“maturity” twenty years later in Balzac v. Porto Rico.139  Chief Justice Taft, 
writing for a unanimous court, adopted Justice White’s “context-driven” 
doctrine of determining territorial incorporation.140  The Court’s two-prong 
approach first held—as did Justice Brown in Bidwell—that certain 
procedural provisions of the Constitution, like the right to trial by jury at 
issue in Balzac, should not be extended to unincorporated territories.141 
The second prong of the Court’s holding addressed the next logical 
question—was Puerto Rico incorporated?142  The Court concluded that for 
a territory to be incorporated “Congress [must] with a clear declaration of 
purpose, and not [with] mere inference or construction” affirm its intention 
to incorporate the territory.143  The Court concluded that Congress had not 
done so with respect to Puerto Rico; and coupled with the nonfundamental 
right at issue, the Court held the constitutional right to trial by jury did not 
extend to the island territory.144  Thus, while Bidwell gave a glimpse of 
competing theories of extraterritoriality, Balzac, for the time at least, shifted 
the Court in the direction of a Constitution that does not “follow[] the 
flag.”145 
 
 134. See, e.g., Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 305 (1922). 
 135. Bidwell, 182 U.S. at 341–42 (White, J., concurring). 
 136. Id. at 293. 
 137. Id. at 341–42. 
 138. Id. at 372 (Fuller, C.J., dissenting) (calling territories in this gray area “disembodied 
shade[s]”). 
 139. 258 U.S. 298 (1922); see Cabranes, supra note 76, at 1688. 
 140. Cabranes, supra note 76, at 1688. 
 141. Balzac, 258 U.S. at 304–05.  The theory was that these rights were inappropriate for 
the “history and condition” of the new territories. See Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 
211 (1903). 
 142. See Balzac, 258 U.S. at 311–12. 
 143. Id. at 311. 
 144. Id. at 312–14. 
 145. See STUART CREIGHTON MILLER, BENEVOLENT ASSIMILATION:  THE AMERICAN 
CONQUEST OF THE PHILIPPINES, 1899–1903, at 157 (1982) (quoting then-Secretary of War 
Elihu Root:  “[A]s near as I can make out the Constitution follows the flag—but doesn’t 
quite catch up with it”); Cabranes, supra note 76, at 1687; see also Andrew Kent, 
Boumediene, Munaf, and the Supreme Court’s Misreading of the Insular Cases, 97 IOWA L. 
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2.  Johnson v. Eisentrager 
The trend of declining to extend constitutional rights beyond the 
sovereign borders of the United States continued through the Second World 
War.  In Eisentrager, the Court’s evaluation centered on the petition for 
writs of habeas corpus by twenty-one German nationals who were captured 
in the service of the German armed forces working in China at the close of 
the war.146  The petitioners had been tried by military commissions in 
Germany and were being held in Landsberg Prison, a prison operated in 
Allied Forces territory but commanded by a U.S. military officer under the 
authority of the Commanding General, European Command.147 
Justice Jackson, writing for a six-Justice majority, cleaved to the 
territorialist tradition of the Court.148  Justice Jackson opined that a 
noncitizen may acquire rights under the Constitution as the relationship 
between that noncitizen and the United States grows, but that the threshold 
for the development of these rights has always been presence in U.S. 
territory.149  In addition, Justice Jackson held that a “nonresident enemy 
alien” does not have “qualified access” to U.S. courts because such access 
poses significant problems for the military.150  Beyond potentially aiding 
the enemy by distracting the military with interruptions by the federal 
courts,151 Justice Jackson argued that such conflict would be “highly 
comforting to enemies of the United States.”152  The majority ultimately 
upheld the jurisdiction of military commissions to try the petitioners and 
denied their applications for the writ of habeas corpus.153 
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas and Justice Burton, dissented 
from the majority’s holding and its conclusion that the Court could not pass 
 
REV. 101, 103 (2011) (arguing that recent Supreme Court jurisprudence misconstrues the 
Insular Cases and that they do not support global constitutionalism). 
 146. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 765 (1950). 
 147. See id. at 765–66. 
 148. See id. at 768.  Justice Jackson added that “[n]othing in the text of the Constitution 
extends [the writ of habeas corpus], nor does anything in our statutes.” Id. 
 149. See id. at 770–72 (arguing that the application of the Fourteenth Amendment was 
tied to territorial jurisdiction (citing Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886))). 
 150. Id. at 776. 
 151. Id. at 779 (“It would be difficult to devise more effective fettering of a field 
commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to submission to call him 
to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the military 
offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home.”). 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 790–91.  Justice Jackson also relied on In re Yamashita and Ex Parte Quirin as 
examples where even enemy combatants captured on U.S. soil were tried by military 
commissions. See In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (holding that General Yamashita of 
the Japanese military command could be tried for war crimes in the Philippines by a hastily 
convened military commission that had sentenced him to death); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 
(1942) (holding that German saboteurs captured off the coast of Long Island, New York, 
could be tried by a secret military commission that had sentenced the saboteurs to death). But 
see infra note 157 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Black’s alternative view of 
these cases). 
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on the petitioner’s habeas corpus claims.154  Justice Black harkened to the 
Court’s decisions in the Insular Cases, noting that those cases did not turn 
on pure territorial constitutionality, but on incorporation.155  Thus, the 
Court’s choice to find the Constitution “wholly inapplicable”156 abroad 
created “a broad and dangerous principle.”157  Justice Black concluded, 
“Our constitutional principles are such that their mandate of equal justice 
under law should be applied as well when we occupy lands across the sea as 
when our flag flew only over thirteen colonies.”158 
3.  Reid v. Covert 
Justice Black was able to convince a plurality of the Court to adopt some 
aspects of his position supporting an extraterritorial constitution seven years 
later in Reid.  The Court held that military tribunals of civilians attached to 
military bases abroad who committed nonmilitary crimes needed to comply 
with the Fifth and Sixth Amendments.159  To justify this departure from 
previous case law,160 Justice Black distinguished the Insular Cases as a 
solution to a different problem—a way around applying incompatible 
American traditions to new territories acquired from government action.161  
Here, however, Justice Black argued that this was a case of the American 
government trying an American citizen who happened to be abroad, and as 
such, the protections of the Constitution should not be stripped away 
because of that coincidence.162 
Justice Harlan filed a concurrence, declining to join the parts of Justice 
Black’s opinion that tried to distinguish the Insular Cases as “historical 
anomalies.”163  In fact, Justice Harlan saw these cases as supporting the 
proposition that there is “no rigid and abstract rule” when applying the 
 
 154. See Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 797 (Black, J., dissenting) (conceding that the Court’s 
ability to review writs of habeas corpus in military tribunal cases is narrow, but that the 
Court’s authority should be extended in this case). 
 155. See id. at 796–97 (citing Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901)). 
 156. Id. at 797. 
 157. Id. at 795.  Justice Black drew a different conclusion from Ex Parte Quirin and In re 
Yamashita, and argued that these cases “emphatically rejected” the contention that enemy 
aliens have no standing for habeas proceedings. Id. at 794.  Justice Black argued that only 
after upholding the Court’s jurisdiction to hear the petitions did the Court deem the military 
tribunals, by which the petitioners were tried, to have competent jurisdiction. Id.; see 
Yamashita, 327 U.S. at 9; Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25. 
 158. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. at 798 (Black, J., dissenting) (“I would hold that our courts 
can exercise [habeas corpus] whenever any United States official illegally imprisons any 
person in any land we govern.”). 
 159. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 40–41 (1957). 
 160. See supra Part II.A.1–2 (discussing the Insular Cases and Eisentrager). 
 161. See Reid, 354 U.S. at 14 (noting that the Insular Cases “involved the power of 
Congress to provide rules and regulations to govern temporarily territories with wholly 
dissimilar traditions and institutions”). 
 162. See id. at 5–6 (“When the Government reaches out to punish a citizen who is abroad, 
the shield which the Bill of Rights and other parts of the Constitution provide to protect his 
life and liberty should not be stripped away just because he happen[ed] to be in another 
land.” (citations omitted)). 
 163. Id. at 67 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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Constitution abroad,164 and viewed those cases as supporting a more 
functional test that required the Court to determine which parts of the 
Constitution applied where.165  In making this determination, the Court 
would weigh the context, the practical necessities, and the possible 
alternatives Congress had in place for applying constitutional provisions.166  
Due to its emphasis on practicality and its refusal to find a bright-line rule, 
this opinion in particular has been pointed to as one of the early forerunners 
to Justice Kennedy’s functionalism.167 
4.  United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez 
The Court more recently tackled the extraterritoriality question in 1990, 
when it held that the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule did not apply 
to the fruits of a warrantless search conducted by U.S. authorities in Mexico 
after an arrest by Mexican authorities.168  Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing 
for the majority, rejected the “global view” of the Constitution169 and relied 
on Eisentrager to hold that constitutional rights only develop for 
noncitizens as their relationship and contacts with the United States 
increases.170  Thus, because the defendant in this case had no prior 
connection to the United States, the Fourth Amendment did not apply to his 
search.171  To bolster this holding, Chief Justice Rehnquist also pointed to 
the practical difficulties of an extraterritorial Constitution, particularly for 
American foreign policy, and argued that such exportation of the 
Constitution should be left to the political branches.172 
Justice Kennedy, who joined Justice Rehnquist in the majority, wrote a 
concurring opinion that looked back to Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion 
in Reid.173  Justice Kennedy espoused a more functional test, whereby the 
Court would determine if extraterritorial application was “impracticable and 
anomalous.”174  Like Justice Harlan, he argued that the Court’s precedent 
suggested that it must balance the constitutional right at issue with the 
power of the United States to “assert its legitimate power and authority 
abroad.”175  In this case, however, where there were no magistrates to issue 
warrants, a potentially different expectation of privacy, and a strong interest 
 
 164. Id. at 74. 
 165. See Neuman, supra note 17, at 265. See generally supra notes 88–89 and 
accompanying text. 
 166. Reid, 354 U.S. at 75 (noting that the question for the Court in these cases was “one 
of judgment, not of compulsion”). 
 167. See Neuman, supra note 17, at 265. 
 168. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261–62 (1990). 
 169. See Cabranes, supra note 76, at 1692. 
 170. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 269, 271. 
 171. Id. at 271. 
 172. Id. at 275. 
 173. Id. at 278 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957) 
(Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 174. Id. (quoting Reid, 354 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring)). 
 175. Id. at 277; Reid, 354 U.S. at 74 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
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in cooperating with the Mexican government, the Fourth Amendment did 
not apply.176 
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,177 pointed to Justice Black’s 
plurality opinion in Reid,178 and argued that extraterritorial prosecutions 
must be subject to application of constitutional protections.179  Whether 
citizen or noncitizen, whether domestic or abroad, Justice Brennan argued 
that the U.S. government is bound to follow the limitations of the 
Constitution, just as the Constitution empowers the government to bind 
those whom it seeks to prosecute.180  In his conclusion, Justice Brennan 
found no difference in the warrant process at home or abroad and concluded 
its purpose to be the same.181 
5.  Rasul v. Bush 
Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Rasul is different from the 
previously discussed cases,182 because it was not a constitutional holding, 
but a statutory one.183  This distinction is important because it shaped the 
nature of Justice Stevens’s analysis.  By focusing on the statutory 
availability of the writ of habeas corpus,184 Justice Stevens was able to skirt 
the precedent of Eisentrager185 without overruling it.186  First, Justice 
Stevens argued that there are two types of habeas corpus at issue—statutory 
and constitutional—and that since Eisentrager ruled on the latter, it did not 
explicitly rule on the former.187  This led to the second part of Justice 
Stevens’s argument, which was that statutory habeas corpus had changed 
since the time of Eisentrager,188 and that Eisentrager did not control 
because Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky had extinguished 
 
 176. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 278. 
 177. Justice Stevens filed a concurring opinion and Justice Blackmun a dissenting 
opinion, both expressing doubt as to government’s power to issue warrants in another 
country. See id. at 279 (Stevens, J., concurring); id. at 297 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 178. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 179. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 281 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The Constitution is 
the source of Congress’ authority to criminalize conduct, whether here or abroad, and of the 
Executive’s authority to investigate and prosecute such conduct.  But the same Constitution 
also prescribes limits on our Government’s authority to investigate, prosecute, and punish 
criminal conduct, whether foreign or domestic.”). 
 180. Id. at 284–85. 
 181. Id. at 296. 
 182. See supra Part II.A.1–4. 
 183. See Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 484 (2004). 
 184. See supra notes 46–50 and accompanying text. 
 185. See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 768 (1950); supra Part II.A.2. 
 186. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 478–79. 
 187. See id. 
 188. Justice Stevens argued that Ahrens v. Clark controlled at the time of Eisentrager. See 
Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948) (holding that the D.C. Circuit lacked statutory 
jurisdiction to hear habeas claims of German military personnel being held at Ellis Island).  
Yet, he argued that Ahrens was later overruled by Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of 
Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484 (1973) (holding that the prisoner’s presence in the territorial 
jurisdiction of the court was not necessary for availability of the writ of habeas corpus). 
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Eisentrager’s “statutory predicate.”189  Thus, Justice Stevens framed the 
legal issue as “whether the habeas statute confers a right to judicial review 
of the legality of executive detention of aliens in a territory over which the 
United States exercises plenary and exclusive jurisdiction, but not ‘ultimate 
sovereignty.’”190  Based on this narrower legal question, Justice Stevens’s 
majority opinion held that Guantanamo Bay detainees were afforded habeas 
corpus rights191 because the United States has “complete jurisdiction and 
control”192 over the base, and that this was sufficient jurisdiction under the 
statutory language of § 2241.193 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence,194 which continued his adherence to the 
functional application of an extraterritorial constitution,195 contended that 
Justice Stevens’s avoidance of Eisentrager was a weakness and that 
Eisentrager controlled.196  Yet, Justice Kennedy was able to distinguish the 
facts of Eisentrager, pointing to the government’s jurisdictional control, the 
prison’s location far from any battlefield, and the detainee’s lack of process, 
as major differences between the Guantanamo detainees and the soldiers 
tried by military commissions in post-war Germany.197 
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, 
dissented from the majority’s opinion.  Justice Scalia argued that the 
majority overruled Eisentrager,198 regardless of its contention that it did 
not, and that by doing so “the Court boldly extend[ed] the scope of the 
habeas statute to the four corners of the earth.”199  He also attacked the 
Court’s argument that Guantanamo is subject to domestic law without 
sovereignty because of the level of control exerted there, noting that if that 
were true, Eisentrager would have come out the same way.200  Justice 
Scalia concluded by cautioning that the Court’s decision will have “a 
potentially harmful effect upon the Nation’s conduct of a war” and that the 
majority’s decision “is judicial adventurism of the worst sort.”201 
 
 189. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 479. 
 190. Id. at 475. 
 191. Id. at 483–84. 
 192. Id. at 480 (citing 1903 Lease Agreement art. III). 
 193. Id. at 483–84. 
 194. Id. at 485 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  This concurrence serves as an important 
forerunner to Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Boumediene. See Neuman, supra note 
17, at 264. 
 195. See Neuman, supra note 17, at 264. See generally supra notes 88–89 and 
accompanying text. 
 196. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 485–87 (arguing that Eisentrager called for a balancing of the 
strength of the prisoner’s claim to the writ against the government’s interest in denying it). 
 197. Id. at 487–88. 
 198. Id. at 496–97 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s analysis of Braden 
overruling Aherns ignored the fact that the decision only dealt with American citizens in the 
United States, not noncitizens held abroad, and also that Braden failed to mention 
Eisentrager at all). But see supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text (distinguishing 
Eisentrager from Braden). 
 199. Rasul, 542 U.S. at 498. 
 200. Id. at 501. 
 201. Id. at 506. 
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B.  The Military Necessity Cases 
Concurrent to the development of the extraterritoriality jurisprudence, 
many of the Court’s key military necessity cases were also decided.  While 
not purely functionalist cases, Milligan, Korematsu, and Youngstown do 
exhibit some functionalist tendencies.  Opinions in these cases also espouse 
the range of military necessity theory:  executive unilateralist, civil 
libertarian, and institutional process.202  The last of these three, while 
certainly different, resembles Justice Kennedy’s functionalist theory, 
particularly in Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence.203  Further, given 
the intersection of extraterritoriality and military necessity in Justice 
Kennedy’s Boumediene holding, these cases also provide important context 
about the difficulty the Court has had in adjudicating military necessity 
cases.  These cases are characterized by having several concurrences, 
vigorous dissents, and companion cases that either complicate or limit the 
majority holdings from the main cases.204  Yet, like the extraterritoriality 
cases, the Court’s military necessity jurisprudence leaves murky precedent 
about the Court’s role in evaluating the government’s ability to balance 
individual rights and government expediency. 
1.  Ex Parte Milligan 
The actual result of Milligan was a rather uncontroversial nine-to-zero 
opinion holding that the President had acted unconstitutionally by allowing 
a citizen to be tried by a military commission in Indiana during the 
American Civil War.205  Yet, the reasoning and conclusions used by the 
majority and the four-member concurrence were particularly divisive and 
subjected to significant scrutiny in the media and the court of public 
opinion.206  This division was again revealed in Ex parte McCardle,207 
where the votes on the Court changed, and the reasoning used by the 
concurrence in Milligan prevailed.208  Thus, Milligan presents a somewhat 
elusive target for clarifying the military necessity doctrine and the Court’s 
annunciation of it.  Yet, the majority and concurrence in Milligan, taken 
together with the Court’s opinion in McCardle, show remnants of the 
 
 202. See supra Part I.C.2. 
 203. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 634 (Jackson, J., concurring); see infra notes 268–74 
and accompanying text. 
 204. See infra notes 205–08, 229–53, 263–74 and accompanying text. 
 205. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 131 (1866); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 
102, at 9–10.  In the midst of the American Civil War, Congress authorized President 
Lincoln to suspend the writ of habeas corpus throughout the United States. See An Act 
Relating to Habeas Corpus, and Regulating Judicial Proceedings in Certain Cases, ch. 81, 12 
Stat. 755 (1863). 
 206. See Howell, supra note 92, at 1797 (noting several articles found in national 
newspapers including the New York Herald, Chicago Tribune, and The New York Times, 
criticizing the majority opinion). 
 207. 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868). 
 208. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 16–17. 
 1418 FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
Court’s division on the scope of the government’s wartime power.209  It 
also demonstrates the Court’s uncertainty in adjudicating military necessity 
cases. 
The unanimous Court agreed that the President and the military had acted 
improperly in trying Milligan by a military commission.  Milligan was a 
U.S. citizen in Indiana, which was not, and never was, part of the 
rebellion.210  The Court’s reasoning on the issue was divided, however.  
Justice Davis’s majority opinion was heavily grounded in rights-based 
language211 that reflected the “Business as Usual” view of the 
Constitution212 championed by civil libertarians.213  These passages have 
been pointed to as “the palladium of the rights of the individual” and “one 
of the bulwarks of American liberty.”214  Justice Davis’s view, while 
elegant, was also couched in some deference to the necessity of the Civil 
War.215  While this language certainly detracts from the pure civil 
libertarianism of Justice Davis’s passage above, it was Chief Justice 
Chase’s concurrence that undercut Justice Davis’s opinion the most.216 
Chief Justice Chase and three concurring Justices viewed the problem in 
Milligan as one that centered on the relationship between Congress and the 
President.217  The Chief Justice wrote that it is “for Congress to determine 
the question of expediency,” and “[t]hat body did not see fit to authorize 
trials by military commission in Indiana, but by the strongest implication 
prohibited [it].”218  Chief Justice Chase’s opinion rested on the view that 
the President had acted without Congress’s authorization, which made 
Milligan’s treatment unconstitutional.219  Thus, Chief Justice Chase and the 
other concurring Justices viewed the majority’s opinion as “an absolutist, 
non-pragmatic vision of constitutional law that ought to be strenuously 
 
 209. See id. at 17. 
 210. See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 131 (1866). 
 211. Id. at 120–21 (“The Constitution of the United States is a law for rulers and people, 
equally in war and in peace, and covers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at 
all times, and under all circumstances.”). 
 212. See Gross, supra note 109, at 1043. 
 213. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 10–11. See generally supra notes 109–
13 and accompanying text. 
 214. Isacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 10 (quoting 3 CHARLES WARREN, THE 
SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 149, 154 (1923)). 
 215. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 109 (“During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times 
did not allow that calmness in deliberation and discussion so necessary to a correct 
conclusion of a purely judicial question.”); id. (admitting that only after the war could the 
Court review the case without, “the admixture of any element not required to form a legal 
judgment”); see also Howell, supra note 92, at 1801. 
 216. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 12–13; Howell, supra note 92, at 1803; 
see also Andrew Kent, The Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 1845–46 (2010) (arguing that the legal and political material 
from the Civil War era shows that the Milligan majority was an outlier, and that the Court’s 
true view recognized the government’s extensive power in times of war). 
 217. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 11. 
 218. Milligan, 71 U.S. at 141 (Chase, C.J., concurring). 
 219. See id.; see also Howell, supra note 92, at 1803; Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 
102, at 12. 
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resisted.”220  Two years later in McCardle, Chief Justice Chase’s more 
limited and institution-based reasoning won out over the highly criticized 
Milligan decision.221  The Chief Justice recognized Congress’s power to 
remove the Court’s jurisdiction in military commission cases, noting that 
the Constitution grants to the Court jurisdiction “under such regulations as 
Congress shall make.”222 
Thus, it becomes clear that any doctrinal points culled from Milligan’s 
majority opinion are limited by the Chief Justice’s concurring opinions in 
that case, and his majority opinion two years later in McCardle.223  
Ultimately, a case that contains some of the most rights-protecting language 
in constitutional law is undercut by more moderate institutional process 
reasoning.224  Milligan and McCardle demonstrate the Court’s earliest 
attempts to curb the scope of the government’s emergency power.225  Yet, 
they are limited by an equally compelling need to show deference to 
properly exercised actions of military necessity by the unified political 
branches.226 
2.  Korematsu v. United States 
While Milligan represented the Court’s attempt to corral the doctrine 
during the Civil War, Korematsu was one of the Court’s more infamous 
attempts to do the same during the Second World War.227  This hotly 
contested five-to-four decision centered on military imposed curfews and 
exclusion from military zones targeted at Japanese Americans, out of a fear 
of sabotage on American bases.228  Justice Black’s majority opinion229 
 
 220. Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 12. 
 221. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) (holding that the jurisdiction 
stripping statute passed after Milligan was constitutional); see Howell, supra note 92, at 
1797 (highlighting Milligan criticism); Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 12 
(describing Chase’s view). 
 222. McCardle, 74 U.S. at 513; see also U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 223. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 12–16. 
 224. See Howell, supra note 92, at 1803–04; Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 12–
13. 
 225. See supra notes 212–15 and accompanying text. 
 226. See Howell, supra note 92, at 1803; Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 12–13. 
 227. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 20 (“Korematsu is excoriated as one of 
the two or three worst moments in American constitutional history.”).  For a sweeping 
account of the Court’s struggles with Korematsu, see PETER IRONS, JUSTICE AT WAR 309–46 
(1983). 
 228. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).  As a response to the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December of 1941, President Roosevelt issued Executive 
Order No. 9066 in February of 1942, which later authorized the exclusion of people of 
Japanese descent from military zones. See Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 Fed. Reg. 1407 (Feb. 19, 
1942) (“[T]he successful prosecution of the war requires every possible protection against 
espionage and against sabotage to national-defense material, national-defense premises, and 
national-defense utilities.”).  Congress ratified this order one month later. See Act of 
Congress of March 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 173 (1942). 
 229. Justice Frankfurter added a concurring opinion that agreed with the majority and 
took it a step further. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 225 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“To find that 
the Constitution does not forbid the military measures now complained of does not carry 
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upheld both the curfew order, “as an exercise of the power of the 
government to take steps necessary to prevent espionage and sabotage in an 
area threatened by Japanese attack,”230 and the exclusion of Japanese 
Americans from military areas, as necessary because it was impossible to 
ascertain the “disloyal from the loyal.”231  While Justice Black was 
sympathetic to the hardship visited upon those affected by the military’s 
actions,232 and while he characterized those actions as “inconsistent with 
our basic governmental institutions,” he nonetheless concluded that when 
“our shores are threatened by hostile forces, the power to protect must be 
commensurate with the threatened danger.”233 
This case also contained compelling dissents from Justices Roberts, 
Murphy, and Jackson, running the gamut from championing individual 
rights to recognizing the Court’s hazy role in addressing military 
necessity.234  Justice Roberts squarely claimed that the military had acted 
purely on the basis of race.235  Justice Roberts viewed the government’s 
actions as a “clear violation of Constitutional rights,”236 denying the 
defendant due process of law,237 and forcing him to choose between an 
unconstitutional imprisonment and illegally remaining in his home.238 
Justice Murphy’s dissent, like Justice Roberts’s, did not lack for strong 
language, arguing that the exclusion in this case “goes over ‘the very brink 
of constitutional power’ and falls into the ugly abyss of racism.”239  Justice 
Murphy contended that the only time military necessity can validly deprive 
an individual of constitutional rights is when the deprivation is reasonably 
related to the public danger.240  Yet in this case, the government’s evidence 
proving public danger from sabotage by Japanese Americans was limited to 
“a few intimations that certain individuals actively aided the enemy.”241 
 
with it approval of that which Congress and the Executive did.  That is their business, not 
ours.”); see Stephen Breyer, Making Our Democracy Work:  The Yale Lectures, 120 YALE 
L.J. 1999, 2021 (2011) (“They might have thought that either President Roosevelt must run 
the war or we must run it.  And we know that we cannot run it.  The result:  judicial 
abnegation.”). 
 230. Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 217. 
 231. Id. at 219. 
 232. Id. (“[W]e are not unmindful of the hardships imposed by [the order] upon a large 
group of American citizens.”). 
 233. Id. at 220. 
 234. See id. at 225 (Roberts, J., dissenting); id. at 240 (Murphy, J., dissenting); id. at 245 
(Jackson, J., dissenting). 
 235. See id. at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting) (“[This] is the case of convicting a citizen as a 
punishment for not submitting to imprisonment in a concentration camp, based on his 
ancestry . . . without evidence or inquiry concerning his loyalty . . . .”). 
 236. Id. at 225. 
 237. Id. at 232. 
 238. Id. at 233. 
 239. Id. (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
 240. Id. at 234 (noting that the danger must be so “immediate, imminent, and impending” 
as not to admit of delay and not to permit the intervention of ordinary constitutional 
processes to alleviate the danger (citing United States v. Russell, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623, 
627–28 (1871))). 
 241. Id. at 240. 
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Justice Jackson provided a more temperate dissent, balancing the 
majority’s acknowledgement of military necessity242 with a condemnation 
of the sanction of the orders as bad constitutional law.243  Justice Jackson 
adopted the position that just as a general may not be subject to the 
Constitution in times of public danger, so too may the Court not be bound 
to approve that expediency as constitutional.244  A military judgment, 
cautioned Justice Jackson, is not “susceptible of intelligent judicial 
appraisal,” and as such, he would have had the Court avoid passing 
judgment on the reasonableness of military commands and instead abide by 
the Constitution as it was written.245 
Beyond these forceful dissents, the companion case to Korematsu, Ex 
parte Endo,246 further complicated Koremastu’s jurisprudence.247  In 
contrast to Korematsu, the Court was unanimous in ending the continued 
detention of Japanese Americans.248  Endo operated under similar facts as 
Korematsu, dealing with the internment of Japanese Americans during 
World War Two.249  Yet, Justice Douglas, who was also in the majority in 
Korematsu,250 concluded that the defendant was entitled to release from 
government-operated internment camps.251  Justice Douglas argued that the 
statute at issue in both cases supported curfew and exclusion, but did not 
support detention.252  Thus, when the military engaged in long-term 
detention, they lost the authorization of Congress and violated the statute.253 
The contrast between Justice Black’s majority opinion in Korematsu254 
and Justice Douglas’s majority opinion in Endo are hard to rationalize given 
the similarity of the two cases.255  Further, given the starkly conflicting 
 
 242. Id. at 244 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“It would be impracticable and dangerous 
idealism to expect or insist that each specific military command in an area of probable 
operations will conform to conventional tests of constitutionality.”). 
 243. Id. (“[Military orders] may have a certain authority as military commands, although 
they may be very bad as constitutional law.”); see also Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, 
at 23 (noting that Jackson’s argument is that “it is unrealistic to expect courts to do anything 
other than rubberstamp military decisions during times of war”). 
 244. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 246 (Jackson, J., dissenting) (“A military commander 
may overstep the bounds of constitutionality, and it is an incident.  But if we review and 
approve, that passing incident becomes the doctrine of the Constitution.”). 
 245. See id. at 245. 
 246. 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
 247. See Patrick O. Gudridge, Remember Endo?, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1933, 1934 (2003) 
(noting that Endo, not Korematsu, should have been the better remembered case, because 
that case actually closed the Japanese American internment camps); Issacharoff & Pildes, 
supra note 102, at 21. 
 248. See Gudridge, supra note 247, at 1947; Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 21. 
 249. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 284–94. 
 250. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 215. 
 251. See Endo, 323 U.S. at 303. 
 252. See id. at 300–02. 
 253. See id.; see also Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 22–23 (arguing that Justice 
Douglas relied on an institutional-process based argument). 
 254. See Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 222. 
 255. See Gudridge, supra note 247, at 1967–68. But see Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 
102, at 22–23 (arguing that the differences between the two cases turned on institutional-
process focused jurisprudence in Endo). 
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opinions within Korematsu, the tenuous balance reached in Korematsu and 
Endo demonstrates the Court’s struggles with adopting cohesive military 
necessity jurisprudence.  Unlike Milligan, which took some steps to protect 
individual rights in times of war, Korematsu was a step back toward a more 
unfettered executive.256 
3.  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v Sawyer 
The next major military necessity case, Youngstown, was decided by the 
Supreme Court seven years after Korematsu and was the result of a 
potential steel workers strike during the Korean War.257  President Truman, 
fearing an interruption in the steel market, issued Executive Order No. 
10,340258 and ordered the Secretary of Commerce to seize the steel mills in 
order to keep them open and running.259  After initially complying with the 
executive order, the mill owners brought a claim in federal court, 
challenging the constitutionality of the President’s actions.260  Just one 
month after the President had issued the executive order, the Supreme Court 
heard arguments on the case.261  In a six-to-three ruling, the Court 
ultimately found in favor of the mill owners.262 
Similar to Milligan and Korematsu, Youngstown presented a complicated 
case with no clear rationale for the holding.  Each of the Justices in the 
majority wrote their own concurrence, suggesting that each was driven by a 
different set of considerations.263  In most of these concurrences, one fact 
proved dispositive, namely that Congress had previously denied the 
President the very power he sought to employ.264  Congress had explicitly 
chosen to deny the executive the power to seize property to settle labor 
disputes during times of emergency.265  Yet, the concurring Justices 
employed differing rationales to get to that point, and there was a definite 
spectrum of opinion regarding the amount of power the President had in the 
absence of Congressional action.266  In contrast, the dissenters, all joining 
 
 256. See Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 20 (noting that the context of Korematsu 
is a “powerful counterexample to any view that executive and legislative checks and 
balances, even in a system of separated and divided powers, are adequate to protect against 
excessive security measures.”). 
 257. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952). 
 258. Exec. Order No. 10,340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (Apr. 10, 1952). 
 259. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583. 
 260. Id. 
 261. See Howell, supra note 92, at 1804.  President Truman entered his order on April 9, 
1952. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 583.  The Court heard arguments on the case starting 
May 12, 1952. Id. at 584. 
 262. See id. at 589; Howell, supra note 92, at 1805 (describing articles in The New York 
Times and Los Angeles Times that called the decision a “stunning rebuke” of the President). 
 263. Howell, supra note 92, at 1805. 
 264. Id. 
 265. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 586; see also 93 CONG. REC. 3637–45 (1947) 
(documenting the Congressional debate that chose not to amend the Taft-Hartley Act to 
allow governmental seizures in times of emergency). 
 266. Justice Black filed a more formalistic opinion. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582–89 
(holding that Congress alone has the power to legislate and, by seizing the steel mills, the 
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an opinion by Justice Vinson, would have recognized much greater power 
for the President in times of emergency.267 
The most doctrinally important of the concurrences was Justice 
Jackson’s.268  Justice Jackson espoused an analytical framework that 
explained how the “the Constitution’s cryptic and deeply ambiguous 
division of authority between Congress and the President in wartime” 
should be understood in actual practice.269  Justice Jackson accomplished 
this by setting up a “three-tiered continuum of presidential power.”270  First, 
when the President is acting with the authorization of Congress, executive 
power is “at its maximum.”271  Second, where Congress has been silent, the 
President may act in a “zone of twilight” where the executive and Congress 
have concurrent authority.272  Lastly, when the President acts against the 
will of Congress “his power is at its lowest ebb.”273  The critical lesson of 
this opinion is twofold:  (1) the Constitution gave the Congress, not the 
executive, the authority to limit civil liberties during war time, and (2) the 
courts must “rigorously scrutinize congressional meaning before finding 
such authorization.”274 
Ultimately, Justice Jackson’s test was one based on an institutional 
process view of military necessity jurisprudence,275 but it represented a 
 
President had infringed on Congress’s power).  Justices Burton, Clark, and Frankfurter saw 
more authority for the President in the absence of congressional action, but here, they all 
agreed that Congress had spoken. See id. at 659–60 (Burton, J., concurring) (arguing that the 
Court was not facing the issue of the President acting to respond to emergency but facing the 
issue of a President who had infringed on Congress’s power); id. at 662 (Clark, J., 
concurring) (arguing that the President is bound to follow the procedures of Congress when 
they exist but, in their absence, the President’s power is limited by the gravity of the 
situation); id. at 609 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“It is quite impossible, however, when 
Congress did specifically address itself to a problem, as Congress did to that of the seizure, 
to find secreted in the interstices of legislation the very grant of power which Congress 
consciously withheld.”).  Justice Douglas worried about an unfettered executive. Id. at 633 
(Douglas, J., concurring) (“We pay a price for our system of checks and balances, for the 
distribution of power among the three branches of government.”). 
 267. Id. at 680 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting) (“Accordingly, if the President has any power 
under the Constitution to meet a critical situation in the absence of express statutory 
authorization, there is no basis whatever for criticizing the exercise of such power in this 
case.”). 
 268. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Hamdi Meets Youngstown:  Justice Jackson’s Wartime 
Security Jurisprudence and the Detention of “Enemy Combatants,” 68 ALB. L. REV. 1127, 
1128 (2005); Sanford Levinson, Why the Canon Should be Expanded To Include the Insular 
Cases and the Saga of American Expansionism, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 241, 242 n.2 (2000). 
 269. Cleveland, supra note 268, at 1128–29. 
 270. Id. at 1129; see also Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635–39 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 271. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 635. 
 272. Id. at 637. 
 273. Id. 
 274. See Cleveland, supra note 268, at 1131; see also Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 
102, at 28. 
 275. See Cleveland, supra note 268, at 1136; Issacharoff & Pildes, supra note 102, at 28; 
see also Joseph Landau, Chevron Meets Youngstown:  National Security and the 
Administrative State, 92 B.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012) (arguing that Youngstown’s 
process-oriented approach has been carried through to the modern post-9/11 cases); supra 
notes 114–15 and accompanying text. 
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doctrine that preserved “flexibility”276 while trying to protect liberty in 
times of national crisis.277  Youngstown was a shift away from the heavily 
deferential holding in Korematsu and back toward the more balanced but 
conflicted doctrine of Milligan.  Further, the emphasis on practicality and 
flexibility in Justice Jackson’s opinion is an important bridge between 
functionalism and the military necessity case law.  It is also an important 
consideration in Part III below. 
III.  BOUMEDIENE V. BUSH AND AL MAQALEH V. GATES:  
FUNCTIONALISM IN PRACTICE 
Part III is divided into two sections, one focusing on Boumediene and the 
other focusing on Al Maqaleh.  These two cases exemplify how 
extraterritoriality and military necessity have intersected and clashed in 
Justice Kennedy’s functionalism.  To help illustrate this point, these 
sections are further broken up into subsections, analyzing majority, 
concurring, and dissenting opinions, with a greater emphasis on the 
majority opinions.  The analysis also uses Justice Kennedy’s three 
Boumediene factors as a helpful tool in distinguishing these cases.  
Ultimately, Boumediene and Al Maqaleh demonstrate a stark contrast in 
reasoning between judges who wish to heavily defer to the military and 
those who seek a more stable balance between expediency and individual 
rights.   
A.  Boumediene v. Bush 
In Boumediene, the Supreme Court held that the detainees imprisoned at 
Guantanamo Bay Naval Base were entitled to habeas corpus hearings 
because the DTA and MCA violated the Suspension Clause of the 
Constitution.278  Boumediene was a five-to-four decision with a 
concurrence and two dissenting opinions.279  Justice Kennedy’s majority 
opinion was joined by Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, Stevens, and Souter.280  
Justice Souter filed a concurring opinion in which Justice Ginsburg and 
Justice Breyer joined.281  Chief Justice Roberts filed a dissent joined by 
Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Alito.282  Justice Scalia also filed a separate 
dissent that was joined by the other three dissenting Justices.283  The 
substance of these opinions ranged from the concurrence’s desire to take 
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion a bit further than he was willing to 
 
 276. See Cleveland, supra note 268, at 1137. 
 277. Id. at 1136. 
 278. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 798 (2008); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 
(“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases 
of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”). 
 279. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 730. 
 280. Id. 
 281. Id. at 799–800 (Souter, J., concurring). 
 282. Id. at 801 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 283. Id. at 826 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
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go,284 to the dissents’ disagreement on both the test the majority proposed 
and the substantive conclusions it reached employing that test.285  Thus, as 
was often the case with the extraterritoriality and military necessity cases 
analyzed in Part II,286 the Supreme Court approached the Boumediene case 
in varied and often contradictory ways. 
1.  Justice Kennedy’s Majority Opinion 
Justice Kennedy’s holding in Boumediene utilized the functionalist test 
he initially espoused in his concurrences in Verdugo-Urquidez and Rasul.287  
Before the holding, however, Justice Kennedy had to make some 
procedural clarification.  First, he held that the MCA effectively stripped 
the federal courts of statutory habeas jurisdiction.288  Thus, for the Court to 
obtain jurisdiction, it had to overrule the MCA as a violation of the 
Suspension Clause of the Constitution.289  Then, Justice Kennedy began his 
constitutional analysis with an exhaustive survey of habeas corpus common 
law precedent, both in the United States and in England,290 ultimately 
concluding that the historical record did not yield a definitive answer.291  
Justice Kennedy then drew on the precedent of the Insular Cases,292 
Eisentrager,293 and Reid,294 concluding that these cases did not espouse a 
purely territoriality driven application of constitutional rights, but also 
weighed context and practical considerations.295  Thus, “[b]ased on th[e] 
language from Eisentrager, and the reasoning in our other extraterritoriality 
opinions,”296 Justice Kennedy developed a test that listed three factors that 
would determine when the Suspension Clause would be applied:  “(1) the 
citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy of the process 
through which that status determination was made; (2) the nature of the 
sites where apprehension and then detention took place; and (3) the 
practical obstacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the 
writ.”297 
While the functionalist factors served as the framework for Justice 
Kennedy’s analysis, he was also motivated by a keen awareness of 
separation of powers principles.  These principles manifested themselves in 
several ways.  Justice Kennedy opined that the writ of habeas corpus was 
 
 284. See infra Part III.A.2. 
 285. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 286. See discussion supra Part II. 
 287. See supra notes 173–76, 194–97 and accompanying text. 
 288. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 739. 
 289. Id. 
 290. See id. at 739–52. 
 291. Id. at 752. 
 292. See supra Part II.A.1. 
 293. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 294. See supra Part II.A.3. 
 295. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 758–64. 
 296. Id. at 766. 
 297. Id. at 766; see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950); supra Part 
II.A.2. 
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both vital to the protection of individual liberty298 and to maintaining a 
limited government.299  Further, Justice Kennedy held that the reach and 
purpose of the Suspension Clause was governed by separation of powers 
principles300 and that these principles were not limited to American 
citizens.301  Also, in rejecting the government’s proposed sovereignty-based 
test, Justice Kennedy was wary of the dangers of a government that could 
intentionally surrender sovereignty, lease back the land it had surrendered, 
and then “govern without legal constraint.”302  Similarly, such a situation 
could lead to the government having the power to “switch the Constitution 
on or off at will.”303  Finally, Justice Kennedy cautioned that the scope of 
the Suspension Clause and the writ of habeas corpus “must not be subject to 
manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain.”304  Thus, the 
analysis of the three factors outlined above proved to be the decisive part of 
Justice Kennedy’s functional, context-driven approach, but his conclusions 
were also informed by separation of powers concerns. 
a.  Adequacy of Process 
Justice Kennedy looked to past precedent when deciding whether the 
process that the petitioner had received was sufficient to eliminate the need 
for habeas review.305  Comparing the military commissions that were used 
in Eisentrager, Justice Kennedy held that the Combatant Status Review 
Tribunals306 (CSRT) used by the government resulted in a situation where, 
“unlike in Eisentrager . . . there has been no trial by military commission 
for violations of the laws of war. . . .  The difference is not trivial.”307  The 
Court concluded that the procedures and adversarial mechanisms that would 
 
 298. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743 (noting that the Framers considered the writ “a vital 
instrument for the protection of individual liberty”). 
 299. Id. at 744 (referencing Alexander Hamilton’s belief that the writ preserves limited 
government); see Marc D. Falkoff & Robert Knowles, Bagram, Boumediene, and Limited 
Government, 59 DEPAUL L. REV. 851, 897 (2010) (arguing that scholarship’s focus on the 
practical aspects of Boumediene “obscured the importance of limited government in the 
extraterritoriality doctrine”). 
 300. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 746; see Gerald Neuman, The Habeas Corpus Suspension 
Clause After Boumediene v. Bush, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 537, 562 (2010) (noting that 
Boumediene emphasizes habeas corpus as a separation of powers mechanism). 
 301. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 743 (arguing that the Constitution’s separation of powers 
structure protects persons as well as citizens and that foreign nationals who have the 
privilege to litigate in American courts can enforce separation of powers principles); see 
Stephen I. Vladeck, Boumediene’s Quiet Theory:  Access to Courts and the Separation of 
Powers, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2107, 2110 (2009) (arguing that Justice Kennedy’s opinion 
construes habeas corpus as “a structural mechanism protecting individual liberty by 
preserving the ability of the courts to check the political branches”). 
 302. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 765. 
 303. Id. 
 304. Id. at 766. 
 305. Id. at 767. 
 306. This is a review by the military “to determine whether individuals detained at the 
U.S. Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, were ‘enemy combatants.’” Boumediene, 553 
U.S. at 733; see also, supra Part I.B. 
 307. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 767. 
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eliminate the need for habeas corpus review had not been applied.308  As 
such, this factor of Justice Kennedy’s test weighed in favor of applying the 
Suspension Clause and granting habeas corpus review. 
b.  Nature and Location of the Detention Sites 
Justice Kennedy at first compared the Guantanamo Bay site to Landsberg 
Prison, the military prison located in Germany at issue in Eisentrager, 
noting that both the detainees’ apprehension and detention were technically 
outside the sovereign territory of the United States.309  Justice Kennedy 
held that this would have weighed against the need for habeas corpus 
review.310  He then distinguished the military prison in Eisentrager from 
Guantanamo Bay, enumerating several key facts.  First, he pointed out that 
“the United States’ control over the prison in Germany was neither absolute 
nor indefinite.  Like all parts of occupied Germany, the prison was under 
the jurisdiction of the combined Allied Forces.”311  Conversely, 
Guantanamo Bay is not such a “transient possession,” and “[i]n every 
practical sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within the constant 
jurisdiction of the United States.”312  For these reasons, Justice Kennedy 
concluded that this factor would weigh in favor of habeas corpus review.313 
c.  Practical Obstacles 
As to the third factor, Justice Kennedy began by noting that “[h]abeas 
corpus proceedings may require expenditures of funds by the Government 
and may divert the attention of military personnel from other pressing 
tasks.”314  However, he contrasted the situation in Eisentrager315 and 
argued that the security threats present after World War II in occupied 
Germany “are not apparent here; nor does the Government argue that they 
are.”316  The U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay consists of forty-five 
square miles of land and water, detains prisoners in a “secure prison facility 
 
 308. Id. 
 309. See id. at 768. 
 310. See id. 
 311. Id. 
 312. Id. at 768–69; see also Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S 466, 487 (2004).  The Court noted 
that the 1903 lease that the United States signed with Cuba, who retains “ultimate 
sovereignty,” is “no ordinary lease,” and that “[i]ts term is indefinite and at the discretion of 
the United States.” Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768–69.  The Court ultimately believed that 
“[w]hat matters is the unchallenged and indefinite control that the United States has long 
exercised over Guantanamo Bay.” Id. 
 313. See Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768–69. 
 314. Id. at 769. 
 315. Id.  The Court noted that the situation was far different in Eisentrager. Id.  There, the 
United States military became responsible for “57,000 square miles with a population of 18 
million people.” Id.  In addition, the United States, who was engaged in reconstruction 
efforts in the affected area, faced the security threats from a “defeated enemy” and “enemy 
elements, guerilla fighters, and ‘werewolves.’” Id. at 769–70 (quoting Johnson v. 
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 784 (1950)). 
 316. Id. at 770. 
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located on an isolated and heavily fortified military base,” and is operated 
by only American military personnel.317   
However, Justice Kennedy admitted that were this not the case, or should 
the detention facility have been located in an “active theater of war,” 
arguments against extending the writ would have more weight.318  Finally, 
there was no jurisdictional friction with the host government, Cuba, because 
no Cuban court had jurisdiction over the American military personnel at 
Guantanamo or the detainees housed there.319  Given that this third and 
final factor also weighed in favor of granting the writ of habeas corpus, 
Justice Kennedy admitted that he was taking a new leap in constitutional 
law but held that the Suspension Clause applied to the Guantanamo 
detainees’ petitions.320 
Before Justice Kennedy could hold that the MCA and DTA violated the 
Suspension Clause and that habeas corpus has full effect at Guantanamo 
Bay,321 he had to consider whether the MCA and DTA provided procedural 
safeguards that were an adequate substitute for habeas corpus.  Particularly, 
Justice Kennedy honed in on the MCA’s provision for a review of a CSRT 
determination by the D.C. Circuit.322  He concluded that because the statute 
does not allow the D.C. Circuit to consider newly discovered exculpatory 
evidence in its review of the legality of the CRST’s findings, the MCA was 
“an insufficient replacement for the factual review these detainees are 
entitled to receive through habeas corpus.”323  An additional consideration 
that drove Justice Kennedy was that some detainees had been waiting for 
six years without judicial scrutiny, and requiring them to test Congress’s 
new procedure would have only caused more delay.324  Therefore, Justice 
Kennedy held that the Suspension Clause applied, and the detainees were 
granted the right to file habeas corpus petitions.325 
2.  Justice Souter’s Concurrence 
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Ginsburg and Breyer, offered a brief 
concurrence that made two succinct points.  First, Justice Souter countered 
Justice Scalia’s dissenting argument about the Court’s “new” application of 
extraterritorial constitutional rights.326  He argued that five members of the 
Court agreed in Rasul that while the outcome only required a decision 
pertaining to the reach of the habeas corpus statute, the historical reach of 
the writ, which is a factor in the constitutional analysis as well, went 
 
 317. Id. 
 318. Id. 
 319. Id. at 770. 
 320. See id. at 770–71. 
 321. Id. 
 322. See supra notes 65–66 and accompanying text. 
 323. Boumediene, 533 U.S. at 791. 
 324. Id. at 794. 
 325. Id. at 771. 
 326. Id. at 799 (Souter, J., concurring). 
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beyond territorial sovereignty.327  Thus, despite Justice Scalia’s arguments 
to the contrary, Justice Souter concluded that, “whether one agrees or 
disagrees with today’s decision, it is no bolt out of the blue.”328 
Justice Souter’s second point squarely addressed the detainee’s six years 
in prison and argued that it was an important factor in the Boumediene 
analysis.329  The dissenting opinions, particularly Justice Roberts’s, argued 
that the majority’s action would only further delay the detainees’ 
imprisonment and the MCA process could be conducted in a reasonable 
amount of time.330  Yet, after six years of little or no action by the military, 
Justice Souter believed that the dissent’s arguments rang hollow.331  
Further, the courts and the writ of habeas corpus had always served, first in 
England and then in the United States, as a check on the power of the 
executive and as a tool for inquiry into the legality of detention.332  Justice 
Souter concluded that Boumediene’s holding was “no judicial victory” but, 
“an act of perseverance in trying to make habeas review, and the obligation 
of the courts to provide it, mean something of value both to prisoners and to 
the Nation.”333 
3.  Justice Roberts’s and Justice Scalia’s Dissents 
Chief Justice Roberts’s dissent, joined by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and 
Alito, began by leaving the difficult and knotty issue of habeas jurisdiction 
at Guantanamo Bay to Justice Scalia, while joining in that opinion.334  
Instead, he honed in on the question of whether the MCA was an adequate 
substitute for habeas corpus; if it were, the Court did not need to reach the 
availability of habeas corpus at all.335  The Chief Justice concluded that the 
DTA was indeed an adequate substitute process336 and presented two 
primary critiques of the majority’s opinion. 
First, the Chief Justice argued that the majority short-circuited the DTA 
process by failing to force the petitioners to exhaust the statutory remedy 
before passing judgment upon it.337  This failure, coupled with the 
majority’s express declination to decide if CSRT proceedings subject to 
Article III review could satisfy due process,338 accorded little deference to 
 
 327. See id. 
 328. Id. 
 329. Id. at 799–800. 
 330. See infra Part III.A.3. 
 331. Boumediene, 533 U.S. at 800. 
 332. Id. 
 333. Id. at 801. 
 334. Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
 335. Id. at 802. 
 336. Id. 
 337. Id. at 803 (noting that given the posture of the petitioners cases, “the Court should 
have declined to intervene until the D.C. Circuit had assessed the nature and validity of the 
congressionally mandated proceedings in a given detainee’s case”). 
 338. Id. at 804.  Chief Justice Roberts cited the plurality in Hamdi as outlining minimum 
due process requirements for a detainee, including the right to notice of the government’s 
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Congress.339  Further, the majority’s decision to replace the system outlined 
in the MCA with a habeas remedy that needed to be crafted ad hoc by the 
district court on remand would likely proceed no faster than the process 
adopted by Congress, and likely “promise[d] to take longer.”340 
Second, the Chief Justice contended that the majority’s objections to the 
DTA were weak compared to the aggressive action it took in striking down 
the statute.341  Relying principally on Hamdi, the Chief Justice argued that 
the Government had met its burden of providing an adversarial proceeding 
with the right to provide evidence that the detainee had been unlawfully 
detained342 as well as providing the possibility of collateral review by an 
Article III court.343  Thus, the MCA offered adequate substitute process and 
“provide[d] the combatants held at Guantanamo greater procedural 
protections than have ever been afforded alleged enemy detainees—whether 
citizens or aliens—in our national history.”344 
Justice Scalia joined the Chief Justice’s critique of the majority’s 
procedural analysis, focusing on two themes in his own dissent.  First, 
Justice Scalia clearly and unabashedly contended that the majority’s 
decision ran counter to military necessity345 and simultaneously lacked 
deference to processes established by the executive and the legislature.346  
Justice Scalia began his dissent by asserting that “America is at war with 
radical Islamists.”347  This statement—accompanied by a history of terror 
attacks against the United States,348 examples of recidivist detainees,349 and 
complex hurdles necessary for military compliance with the Court’s 
purportedly new standard350—vividly articulated Justice Scalia’s focus on 
 
classification proceeding and the right to rebut that classification before a neutral decision 
maker. 
 339. Id. at 805. 
 340. Id. at 806. 
 341. Id. at 808. 
 342. Id. at 816–18. 
 343. Id. at 812 (discussing also that while the MCA’s collateral review may have been 
weaker than normal habeas corpus review, it did not need to meet the normal standards 
because of the nature of the ongoing military conflict (citing Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 
507 (2004))). 
 344. Id. at 826. 
 345. Id. at 827–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“The game of bait-and-switch that today’s 
opinion plays upon the Nation’s Commander in Chief will make the war harder on us.  It will 
almost certainly cause more Americans to be killed.”). 
 346. Id. at 831 (“What competence does the Court have to second-guess the judgment of 
Congress and the President on such a point?”).  Justice Scalia’s answer was “[n]one 
whatever.” Id. 
 347. Id. at 827.  It is worth noting that this statement evokes a mindset and atmosphere 
found in many of the executive unilateralist opinions in the military necessity cases 
mentioned in Part II.B of this Note, such as Milligan, Korematsu, and Youngstown. 
 348. Id. at 827–28. 
 349. Id. at 828–29 (“At least 30 of those prisoners hitherto released from Guantanamo 
Bay have returned to the battlefield.”).  Justice Scalia noted situations where former 
detainees kidnapped Chinese dam workers, died fighting Pakistani commandos, returned to 
battle as Taliban commanders, and murdered an Afghan judge. Id. 
 350. Id. at 829.  As an example, Justice Scalia argued that a higher evidentiary standard 
would be burdensome because “even when the military has evidence that it can bring 
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military necessity.  Further, Justice Scalia argued that the two branches best 
equipped to deal with this kind of military problem, the executive and the 
legislative, had been “elbow[ed] aside”351 by the judiciary.352  Justice 
Scalia concluded that answers to “how to handle enemy prisoners in this 
war will ultimately lie with the branch that knows least about national 
security concerns that the subject entails.”353 
Second, Justice Scalia argued that the majority’s analysis of the 
extraterritorial application of habeas corpus was not supported by the 
Court’s precedent354 or common law.355  He believed that the Court both 
misapplied the precedent of the Insular Cases,356 Eisentrager357, and 
Reid,358 and misconstrued the history of the writ of habeas corpus.359  As to 
common law, Justice Scalia cited precedent that would limit the reach and 
prohibitions of the Suspension Clause only to facets of the writ that existed 
at the time of the founding360 and argued that the writ would not have been 
available.361 
The weight of military necessity and the majority’s mischaracterization 
of extraterritoriality precedent led Justice Scalia to conclude that the Court’s 
action was driven by “an inflated notion of judicial supremacy.”362  Justice 
Scalia chastised the majority363 and chided that, “the text and history of the 
Suspension Clause provide no basis for our jurisdiction.”364  He ominously 
concluded that “[t]he Nation will live to regret what the Court has done 
today.”365 
 
forward, it is often foolhardy to release that evidence to the attorneys representing our 
enemies.” Id. 
 351. Id. at 830. 
 352. Id. at 831 (arguing that the passage of the MCA “emphatically” reasserted the 
political branches intent to forbid detainees from filing habeas petitions). 
 353. Id. 
 354. Id. at 841–42. 
 355. Id. at 844–48. 
 356. Id. at 838–39 (arguing that the Insular Cases all turned on territorial sovereignty, 
which the United States had in the territories like Puerto Rico but not in Landsberg or 
Guantanamo Bay). 
 357. Id. at 834 (arguing that Eisentrager “conclusively establishes the opposite” of a 
functionalist approach to the extraterritoriality of habeas corpus). 
 358. Id. at 839 (arguing that the holding of Reid likewise offers little precedent for the 
majority’s functionalist reading of Eisentrager, because the “practical considerations” relied 
on in that case applied to American citizens abroad). 
 359. See id. at 843–48. 
 360. Id. at 844 (citing McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131, 135–36 (1934)). 
 361. Id. at 847 (“[T]he writ would not have been available at common law for aliens 
captured and held outside the sovereign territory of the Crown.”). 
 362. Id. at 842. 
 363. Id. at 849–50 (arguing that the court had “warp[ed]” the Constitution, “blatantly 
misdescribe[d]” judicial precedent, broke “a chain of precedent as old as the common law,” 
and “tragically” undermined the efficacy of the military). 
 364. Id. at 849. 
 365. Id. at 850. 
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B.  Al Maqaleh v. Gates 
Subsequent to the Boumediene decision, another detainee litigation made 
its way into federal court.  In 2009, Judge Bates decided Al Maqaleh in the 
District Court for the District of Columbia.366  Judge Bates, viewing 
Boumediene as precedential, employed the Boumediene factors to conclude 
that the petitioner detainees at Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan were 
entitled to habeas corpus review because the Suspension Clause applied to 
the DTA and MCA with respect to Bagram.367  He concluded that all three 
factors in the Boumediene test weighed in favor of applying the Suspension 
Clause:  the petitioners had been given inadequate process, the U.S. 
exercised sufficient control over Bagram to establish de facto jurisdiction, 
and the practical factors that could make extension of habeas too 
burdensome for the government were not substantial enough to require 
denying habeas corpus review.368 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the district court and held that the 
Suspension Clause did not extend to Bagram.369  Applying the Boumediene 
factors, in a similar but more abbreviated manner, the court reached a 
factually different conclusion.370  While the D.C. Circuit agreed with the 
district court that the detainees had been afforded insufficient process, as in 
Boumediene, the court argued that the location and practical concerns were 
decisive.371  The court held that Afghanistan was an “active theater of war” 
and that this fact differentiated Bagram from Guantanamo Bay.372  Thus, 
the detainees were not afforded habeas corpus rights.373 
1.  The District Court 
Judge Bates of the District Court of the District of Columbia was one of 
the first to extend the three-factor Boumediene test and its application to a 
new set of detainees in a new detention facility outside of the United 
States.374  When considering the foreign, “enemy combatant” detainees 
held in Bagram Air Force Base in Afghanistan, Judge Bates immediately 
saw a “close[] parallel”375 to the facts and circumstances in Boumediene 
and went so far as to hold that “the Bagram detainees in these cases are 
virtually identical to the Guantanamo detainees in Boumediene, and the 
 
 366. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. 
Cir. 2010). 
 367. Id. at 232 (“Here, of course, there is a very close historical precedent—Boumediene 
itself, which compels this outcome.”). 
 368. Id. at 231. 
 369. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 99 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 370. Id. 
 371. Id. at 96–98. 
 372. Id. 
 373. Id. 
 374. See Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 207–08 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 605 
F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (recognizing that this case called “for the first application of the 
multi-factor functional test crafted by the Supreme Court in Boumediene”). 
 375. Id. 
 2012] FUNCTIONALISM’S MILITARY NECESSITY PROBLEM 1433 
circumstances of their detention are quite similar as well.”376  Thus, the 
close historical precedent of Boumediene “compel[led]”377 Judge Bates to 
hold that the Suspension Clause barred the MCA’s jurisdiction stripping 
effects on the Bagram detainee’s habeas corpus petitions.378 
Judge Bates’s application of the Boumediene factors is important for 
several reasons.  First, the opinion’s reasoning stands in stark contrast to 
that employed on appeal in the D.C. Circuit.379  To begin, Judge Bates 
broke down the three Boumediene factors into a more specific grouping of 
six subfactors380 that merely clarified the original Boumediene factors.381  
Judge Bates then concluded that three of the six factors, “citizenship, site of 
apprehension, and status,” were “roughly the same as [they were] for the 
petitioners in Boumediene” and would weigh in favor of the detainees.382  
The adequacy of process factor weighed more heavily in favor of detainees 
at Bagram than at Guantanamo because the United States afforded less 
process in Afghanistan than it did in Cuba.383  The remaining two factors, 
site of detention and practical obstacles, did pose some problems for the 
detainees.  Yet, Judge Bates held that while Bagram was different in 
proximity to the United States,384 there was still a high “objective degree of 
control.”385  Yet, Judge Bates also admitted that there was a lesser 
“objective degree of control” at Bagram than at Guantanamo.386  
 
 376. Id. at 232. 
 377. Id. 
 378. Id. at 231. 
 379. The D.C Circuit’s eventual reversal of Judge Bates’s decision will be analyzed in the 
next section. See infra Part III.B.2. 
 380. The six factors are:  “(1) the citizenship of the detainee; (2) the status of the detainee; 
(3) the adequacy of the process through which the status determination was made; (4) the 
nature of the site of apprehension; (5) the nature of the site of detention; and (6) the practical 
obstacles inherent in resolving the petitioner’s entitlement to the writ.” Al Maqaleh, 604 F. 
Supp. 2d at 215. 
 381. See supra notes 296–97 and accompanying text. 
 382. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 231.  The petitioners were not American citizens, 
they were deemed to be enemy combatants by the United States, and they were apprehended 
outside the sovereign territory of the United States. Id. at 208–09. 
 383. Id.  The detainees were reviewed by an Unlawful Enemy Combatant Review Board 
and were unable to appeal their decision to a neutral decision-maker, making this process 
“less sophisticated and more error-prone” than the CRST process held unconstitutional in 
Boumediene. Id. at 227. 
 384. Id. at 231 (“[T]he Court does not conclude that Bagram, like Guantanamo, is ‘not 
abroad.’”). 
 385. Id. at 223.  Judge Bates described the actual status of the United States presence at 
Bagram.  The United States has both a lease and a “Status of Forces Agreement” (SOFA) 
with Afghanistan, which, when read together, appear to grant the United States “near-total 
operational control at Bagram.” Id. at 222.  The lease allows the United States exclusive use 
of Bagram while the SOFA allows U.S. personnel to enter and leave Afghanistan without a 
passport and exempts U.S. vehicles, imports, and exports from taxation and regulation. Id. 
 386. Id. at 223. Judge Bates recognized significant differences between Guantanmo and 
Bagram, and put Bagram between Guantanamo and Landsberg in Eisentrager on a spectrum 
of control.  Unlike Guantanamo, Bagram was occupied by allied forces rather than just U.S. 
forces, making it more similar to Landsberg, while a SOFA acknowledges the sovereignty of 
the state on whose territory it applies—thus it recognizes actual de jure Afghani sovereignty 
at Bagram. Id. at 223 n.16.  Also, the agreement at Guantanamo provides the United States 
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Ultimately, these differences were not enough to weigh against a finding of 
de facto sovereignty387 at Bagram and did not “tip the balance” against the 
detainees.388  Finally, the practical obstacles factor, while more of an issue 
at Bagram than at Guantanamo due to Bagram’s location near an “active 
theater of war,”389 distance from the United States, and potential friction 
with the host country, was not significant enough to counsel against the 
application of the Suspension Clause.390 
While the only judge to pass on the issue at the time, in the brief 
interlude between the District Court decision and the D.C. Circuit’s review, 
Judge Bates’s analysis was supported by contemporaneous scholarship that 
saw the same parallels between Guantanamo and Bagram.391  One scholar 
noted that when comparing seven similar factors between the leases at 
Guantanamo and Bagram,392 it became apparent that the United States had 
“a similarly unconstrained, practical control over its operations in 
Bagram.”393  Further, the only real distinctions between Guantanamo and 
Bagram in the determination of the second factor lay in the fact that 
Guantanamo was “literally oceans away from any battlefield and, arguably, 
as insulated from military conflict as a naval base inside Florida.”394  Yet, 
such battlefield considerations seemed to be more at home in the third 
factor rather than the second.395 
 
with “‘complete jurisdiction and control’ over the military base,” id. at 222, while the SOFA 
does not grant the U.S. criminal jurisdiction over Afghan workers or allied personnel, nor 
does it grant civil jurisdiction over claims brought by individuals. Id. at 223.  Lastly, the 
United States has declared that it will remain at Bagram only as long as military operations 
last, and although this intent does not explicitly state a term to the lease, it is significantly 
different from the permanent installation at Guantanamo. Id. at 225. 
 387. See id. at 223 (“But the differences in control and jurisdiction set forth above do not 
significantly reduce the ‘objective degree of control’ the United States has at Bagram.”). 
 388. Id. at 209. 
 389. Id. at 230.  In Boumediene, Justice Kennedy noted that if a facility were located in an 
“active theater of war” the government would be accorded greater weight in the 
determination of the “practical” obstacles factor. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 770 
(2008); see also supra note 318 and accompanying text.  Judge Bates recognized that 
Bagram was in such an “active theater of war” but was not persuaded that this “dictum” from 
Boumedieme would lead to “dire” consequences. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 230.  The 
most compelling factor for Judge Bates, however, was that “[t]he only reason that these 
petitioners are in an active theater of war is because respondents brought them there.” Id. at 
230–31. 
 390. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 231. 
 391. Baher Amzy, Executive Detention, Boumediene, and the New Common Law of 
Habeas, 95 IOWA L. REV. 445, 491–95 (2010). 
 392. Id.  These factors include:  (1) ultimate ownership; (2) exclusive use rights; (3) right 
to perpetual possession, subject to U.S. termination; (4) consideration; (5) host country’s 
lack of control over territory; (6) rights of United States to assign the agreement; and (7) the 
current duration of the lease. Id. 
 393. Id. at 493. 
 394. Id. at 494. 
 395. Id. (“Perhaps these considerations are relevant only to the third of the Boumediene 
factors:  whether there are practical obstacles inherent in extending the writ.”). 
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Lastly, Judge Bates recognized an additional factor that “tacitly 
informed”396 Boumediene’s holding—the “length of a petitioner’s detention 
without adequate review.”397  While unable to fully analyze this factor 
separately, like those explicitly recognized in Boumediene, Judge Bates was 
clear that this consideration could “shade” the determinations of other 
factors, such as “practical obstacles,” and should be considered in the 
overall balancing.398  This sentiment was reaffirmed in the decisive 
reasoning at the conclusion of the opinion, where Judge Bates held that the 
application of the Suspension Clause was even more warranted considering 
“that these petitioners were apprehended elsewhere more than six years ago 
and are only in the Afghan theater of war because the United States chose to 
send them there.”399 
2.  The D.C. Circuit 
The D.C. Circuit’s opinion,400 written by Chief Judge Sentelle, was 
markedly different in form and substance from Judge Bates’s decision 
below.  Rather than taking Boumediene as a starting point and applying the 
factors, the legal analysis went back to earlier precedent and gave a detailed 
historical recount of the lay of the land prior to Boumediene.401  
Recognizing that the context of the earlier cases provided much of the force 
of the Boumediene opinion, Chief Judge Sentelle concluded that the 
mandate from Boumediene was to apply the “common thread” of a 
functional theory of territoriality based on objective and practical concerns 
that ran through the Insular Cases, Eisentrager, and Reid.402  Chief Judge 
Sentelle held that the three factors in Boumediene were relevant as a way to 
apply that “common thread,”403 but that the context of the earlier cases also 
colored the application of those factors.  Thus, when reviewing the District 
Court’s decision de novo, the court reexamined Judge Bates’s factual 
 
 396. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 216 (D.D.C. 2009); see also Boumediene 
v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 794 (2008) (“In some of these cases six years have elapsed without 
the judicial oversight that habeas corpus or an adequate substitute demands.”); id. at 799–
800 (Souter, J., concurring) (“A second fact insufficiently appreciated by the dissents is the 
length of the disputed imprisonments, some of the prisoners represented here today having 
been locked up for six years . . . .”). 
 397. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 216. 
 398. Id. at 216–17; see also Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 794–95 (majority opinion) (“While 
some delay in fashioning new procedures is unavoidable, the costs of delay can no longer be 
borne by those who are held in custody.”). 
 399. Al Maqaleh, 604 F. Supp. 2d at 231. 
 400. Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010). 
 401. See id. at 88–94; see Stephen Vladeck, The D.C. Circuit After Boumediene, 41 
SETON HALL L. REV. 1451, 1454–56 (2011) (noting a debate among scholars about the D.C. 
Circuit’s efforts in undermining the Supreme Court in many War on Terror cases, and 
arguing that while the D.C. Circuit has not blatantly undermined the Court, it has not 
necessarily been faithful in applying its precedent.). 
 402. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 93. 
 403. Id. 
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conclusions in each of the three Boumediene factors and ultimately reached 
a different result.404 
a.  Adequacy of Process 
Chief Judge Sentelle’s application of the Boumediene factors began with 
the first prong of the test, the adequacy of process. Like the District Court 
below, the D.C. Circuit held that this factor weighed in favor of the 
detainees.405  Chief Judge Sentelle first recognized that as far as citizenship 
and status were concerned, the detainees at Guantanamo in Boumediene 
differed “in no material respect” from the detainees at Bagram, and as such, 
neither citizenship nor status would weigh against their claim to protection 
under the Suspension Clause.406  Chief Judge Sentelle then held that the Al 
Maqaleh petitioners were not tried by either a military commission, as in 
Eisentrager, or by a CSRT, held to be insufficient in Boumediene, and 
agreed with Judge Bates’s contention that the Unlawful Enemy Combatant 
Review Board afforded less protection than even a CRST.407  Chief Judge 
Sentelle also agreed that “while the important adequacy of process factor 
strongly supported the extension of the Suspension Clause and habeas 
rights in Boumediene, it even more strongly favors petitioners here.”408 
b.  Nature and Location of Detention Site 
Chief Judge Sentelle moved onto the second factor and held that it 
weighed heavily in favor of the government.409  Unlike Judge Bates, Chief 
Judge Sentelle did not find the high degree of objective control or the lease 
agreements dispositive and held that the “surrounding circumstances are 
hardly the same.”410  Chief Judge Sentelle identified a few key differences.  
First, the United States had not occupied Bagram as long or with the same 
intention of permanence as Guantanamo, which had been occupied for more 
than one hundred years in the face of a hostile government.411  Bagram, 
conversely, had options in the lease that would have allowed the United 
States to remain for a longer duration, but Chief Judge Sentelle, as Judge 
Bates had acknowledged below,412 found that the United States did not 
intend to remain at Bagram long term.413  In addition, there was no 
“hostility” with the host country, unlike at Guantanamo where the U.S.-
 
 404. Id. at 94. 
 405. Id. at 96 (“[T]he petitioners are in a stronger position for the availability of the writ 
than were either the Eisentrager or Boumediene petitioners.”). 
 406. Id. at 95–96. 
 407. Id.; see supra note 383 and accompanying text. 
 408. Id. (quoting Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 604 F. Supp. 2d 205, 227 (D.D.C. 2009), rev’d, 
605 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010)). 
 409. Id. at 96–97. 
 410. Id. at 97. 
 411. Id. 
 412. See supra note 386 and accompanying text. 
 413. Al Maqaleh, 605 F.3d at 96–97. 
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Cuba relationship had been strained for decades.414  Ultimately, Chief 
Judge Sentelle saw a closer parallel between Bagram and Landsberg prison 
in Eisentrager than with Guantanamo in Boumediene.  Because he 
concluded that there was a much lesser degree of de facto sovereignty over 
Bagram, this factor favored the government.415 
c.  Practical Obstacles 
Given that Chief Judge Sentelle had split the first two factors between the 
government and the petitioners, the third factor ended up being 
dispositive.416  He held that not only was the government’s argument for 
practical obstacles to adjudicating habeas petitions stronger in this case than 
in Boumediene, but that it was stronger even than that in Eisentrager.417  To 
bolster this assertion, Chief Judge Sentelle plainly stated early in the 
practical obstacles analysis that “[i]t is undisputed that Bagram, indeed the 
entire nation of Afghanistan, remains a theater of war.”418   
By invoking the “theater of war” language, Chief Judge Sentelle was able 
to make several important points.  First, it allowed the Chief Judge to 
distinguish Boumediene, where the Court held that “‘if the detention facility 
were located in an active theater of war, arguments that issuing the writ 
would be impractical or anomalous would have more weight.’”419  Further, 
the Court had held that threats posed by a “defeated enemy” at Landsberg, 
something the Court in Eisentrager had relied on, were not apparent at 
Guantanamo.420  Considering that Afghanistan was an active theater of war, 
something that even Landsberg could not claim, Chief Judge Sentelle 
concluded that the threats at Bagram were even greater than those in either 
of the two previous cases.421  Thus, Chief Judge Sentelle held that the 
petitioners could not credibly dispute that “all of the attributes of a facility 
exposed to vagaries of war are present in Bagram,” and that the ability for 
detainees to have civil courts hear habeas petitions “would hamper the war 
effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy.”422  As such, the only result 
consistent with Eisentrager, as clarified in Boumediene, would be to hold 
that the right to the writ of habeas corpus and the privilege of the 
Suspension Clause do not extend to Bagram.423 
Chief Judge Sentelle did not end there but concluded with an important 
caveat to the holding with the potential to aid future petitioners.  While 
holding that such consequences did not occur in this case, the Chief Judge 
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admitted that this holding created a risk of the evasion of judicial review by 
the military and the executive branch.  This could be effected by 
transferring detainees into active conflict zones, “thereby granting the 
Executive the power to switch the Constitution on or off at will.”424  This 
concern would not fit neatly into either the second or third factor 
enumerated by the Court in Boumediene, but Chief Judge Sentelle noted 
that the Court’s list in Boumediene was not exhaustive, and in a case where 
the claim was more reality than speculation, “such manipulation by the 
Executive might constitute an additional factor.”425  This additional factor 
could potentially weigh in favor of the detainees in a future claim. 
IV.  MOVING AWAY FROM PRACTICAL FACTORS IN 
JUSTICE KENNEDY’S FUNCTIONALIST TEST 
The disparate outcomes of the Boumediene and Al Maqaleh litigations set 
out in Part III highlight several issues that hinder clear extraterritorial 
habeas corpus jurisprudence, both for detainees seeking habeas protection 
and for judges trying to adjudicate their claims.  The D.C. Circuit’s decision 
has created two classes of detainees.  One class, that at Guantanamo Bay, 
has access to the federal courts to seek release, while the other remains in a 
legal black hole at Bagram.426  While appellate review still remains a 
possibility, Judge Bates’s recent decision to dismiss Al Maqaleh’s amended 
habeas corpus petition only highlights the direness of his legal prospects.427  
Thus, the Boumediene and Al Maqaleh schism, and the current status of 
detainees outside of Guantanamo, place a renewed focus on functionalism 
and a need to reevaluate Justice Kennedy’s expression of this doctrine.  For 
functionalism to remain a vital part of constitutional adjudication, Justice 
Kennedy’s test must change. 
Part IV of this Note advocates for changes to Justice Kennedy’s three-
factor test to better serve his stated goals of protecting individual liberty and 
preserving the separation of powers.428  Part IV.A revisits the D.C. Circuit’s 
opinion in Al Maqaleh and analyzes how that court diverged from both the 
district court and the Supreme Court in Boumediene.  Part IV.B proposes a 
new test that moves away from the “practical obstacle” factor and toward a 
new factor that was a recurrent theme in the Boumediene and Al Maqaleh 
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litigations—the abuse or avoidance of process.  This updated and 
reorganized set of factors allows for a more predictable brand of 
functionalism that both permits the government the flexibility to determine 
constitutionally sound procedural rights, as well as protect individuals from 
executive overreach. 
A.  The D.C. Circuit’s Al Maqaleh v. Gates Opinion Revisited 
There were factual differences between Boumediene and Al Maqaleh, but 
the juxtaposition of Judge Bates’s decision below and the D.C. Circuit’s 
reversal show that the D.C. Circuit more strongly emphasized inherent 
military necessity in the “practical obstacles” factor.  Judge Bates observed 
that the situations of the detainees at Guantanamo and Bagram were 
“virtually identical” and he felt “compelled” to hold as Boumediene did, 
applying the Suspension Clause to the MCA’s jurisdiction-stripping at 
Bagram.429  Further, to get to that holding, Judge Bates’s analysis of the 
factors was thorough, noting the similar standing of the detainees, carefully 
comparing the locations of Guantanamo and Bagram, and scrutinizing the 
government’s “practical obstacles” argument.430  This analysis was 
supported by scholarship that analyzed the two leases and found them to be 
almost identical.431 
In contrast, the D.C. Circuit’s review of the facts was less 
comprehensive.  Chief Judge Sentelle agreed with the district court that the 
adequacy of process factor weighed in favor of the detainees, but as to the 
other two factors, there was little accord.432  For the second factor, site of 
detention, Chief Judge Sentelle looked beyond the leases themselves, and 
found the circumstances at Bagram to be different than those at 
Guantanamo.433  Chief Judge Sentelle focused on the lesser degree of 
permanence at Bagram, characterized by the intent to leave at some point in 
the future.434  Yet, while these concerns were substantial enough to be 
addressed in Boumediene,435 the scope of control analysis performed by 
Judge Bates’s opinion found that the United States had near total 
operational control at Bagram.436  Further, he held that this consideration 
outweighed concerns about permanence and jurisdiction and held that the 
disposition of this factor favored the detainees.437  Thus, the D.C. Circuit 
did not give enough credence to the practical autonomy that the United 
States had at Bagram.  The relative weakness of the D.C. Circuit’s analysis 
of the second factor suggests that it bypassed the similarities of 
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Guantanamo and Bagram, and instead focused on the meat of its 
argument—military necessity in the “practical obstacles” factor. 
The disposition of the third factor, “practical obstacles,” was where the 
D.C. Circuit most significantly diverged from the district court and the 
holding of Boumediene.  This factor turned on a small piece of Justice 
Kennedy’s “practical obstacles” analysis, where he cautioned that the 
Government’s case would have had more weight had the detention facility 
been located in an “active theater of war.”438  The district court’s and D.C. 
Circuit’s analyses of this element could not have been more different.  
Judge Bates acknowledged that Bagram was in an “active theater of war,” 
but gave more weight to the fact that the United States had sufficient 
control over Bagram and had intentionally moved the detainees there.439  
Thus, Judge Bates held that this factor weighed in favor of the detainees.440 
Chief Judge Sentelle, however, relied almost entirely on the “active 
theater of war” language and recalled the precedent of Eisentrager where 
the Court had denied habeas corpus review to detainees in post-war 
Europe.441  Since Bagram was located in an “active theater of war,” the 
government had a better case than in either Eisentrager or Boumediene.442  
Invoking language reminiscent of the military necessity cases,443 Chief 
Judge Sentelle held that all the “vagaries of war” were present at Bagram, 
and granting the petitioners habeas corpus rights would “bring aid and 
comfort to the enemy.”444  Thus, this factor weighed in favor of the 
government and, combined with the second factor, counseled against the 
application of the Suspension Clause and habeas corpus review.445  Having 
weighed the close determination of the second factor in favor of the 
government, Chief Judge Sentelle held that the Constitution and the 
Suspension Clause did not travel to Guantanamo.446 
After comparing the D.C. Circuit’s alternate determinations of the second 
and, particularly, the third factors to those of the district court, it becomes 
clear that the district court’s holding undermines, if not clashes with, the 
spirit of Justice Kennedy’s Boumediene decision.  To be sure, as Justice 
Kennedy held in Boumediene, the location of a detention site in an “active 
theater of war” has bearing on the determination of that factor.447  Yet, 
Boumediene did not hold that an “active theater of war” would be 
dispositive; rather, it would “carry more weight.”448   
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Further, the spirit of Justice Kennedy’s opinion was twofold.  First, he 
espoused a flexible and context-driven test based on objective factors.449  
Second, Justice Kennedy paid special attention to the important protections 
that the writ of habeas corpus provided throughout American history and 
the separation of powers principles that informed the writ’s purpose.450  
There were opportunities for the majority in Boumediene to defer to the 
executive and military,451 but as Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Scalia 
protested in their dissents, the majority refused to defer to the political 
branches.452  Thus, while the three-factor test was the relevant legal test for 
the Al Maqaleh decision, it was passed down with a spirit of judicial 
independence from the political branches and emphasis on the protection of 
individual rights.453  It was this spirit that was missing from the D.C. 
Circuit’s opinion, where it was instead replaced with an emphasis on 
military necessity and deference to the executive branch. 
Even so, it would be hard to call the D.C. Circuit’s decision an anomaly.  
Given the freedom to invoke military necessity through the “active theater 
of war” and “practical obstacles” language, the D.C Circuit had a powerful 
argument against extending the Suspension Clause to Bagram, just as 
Justice Scalia echoed in his Boumediene dissent with respect to 
Guantanamo.454  Ultimately, the Al Maqaleh decision is as much a 
symptom of the easily manipulated functionalist test455 set out by Justice 
Kennedy in Boumediene as it is as about the D.C. Circuit’s choice to look 
past Boumeidene’s spirit and precedent. 
B.  A New Functional Test 
This section proposes two changes to Justice Kennedy’s three part 
functionalist test.  The first looks to cabin the effect that military necessity 
has on the “practical obstacles” factor by either redefining or removing the 
“active theater of war” language from the functionalist analysis.  The 
second advocates for the addition of another factor, abuse or avoidance of 
process, which places a renewed emphasis on Justice Kennedy’s 
commitment to protection of the individual. 
1.  Moving Away from Military Necessity in 
the “Practical Obstacles” Factor 
Given the unpredictable and highly contested nature of the Supreme 
Court’s jurisprudence in the extraterritoriality and military necessity cases 
discussed in Parts II and III, the differences between Boumediene and Al 
Maqaleh should not come as a surprise.  The Court’s difficulties in 
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adjudicating military necessity and balancing expediency and individual 
rights have resulted in confusing and often highly criticized holdings.456 
Milligan, a stern rebuke of executive overreach, only stood for a few years 
before being effectively overruled by the more deferential McCardle.457  
Korematsu put the Supreme Court’s stamp of approval on the military’s 
internment of Japanese American citizens, while the companion case of 
Endo, which ended the internment, has been essentially forgotten.458  The 
six-to-three Youngstown decision was a sharp deviation from Korematsu, 
but was justified via six competing concurrences, each with a different 
reason for why the President’s actions were unconstitutional.459   
Despite their differences, the underlying theme of all of these cases is the 
Court’s struggle to determine its role in the adjudication of military 
necessity.  As Justice Jackson argued in dissent in Korematsu, military 
judgments are not “susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal” and the 
courts should avoid passing judgment on the reasonableness of military 
commands.460  Further, once the Court reviews and approves that 
command, it becomes constitutional law, which other courts are bound to 
follow.461  Judicial decisions predicated on review of military commands, 
as Justice Jackson cautioned, often create bad constitutional precedent.462 
These warnings ring true when confronted with the highly subjective 
nature of Justice Kennedy’s functionalist test and the D.C. Circuit’s 
application of “active theater of war” rationale in the “practical obstacles” 
factor.  The reliance on military necessity that drove the D.C. Circuit in Al 
Maqaleh,463 similar to the majority’s reliance on it in Korematsu,464 may 
have appeared as expedient or deferential at the time of the decision.  Yet, 
what is at one time military necessity may not appear to be so five, ten, or 
even fifty years later.  As was the case with Japanese American internment 
during the Second World War, such decisions may be viewed in a 
completely different light when the threat has subsided.465  This point is 
highlighted by Justice O’Connor in Hamdi where, on one hand, she 
authorized the indefinite detention of suspected terrorists under the AUMF 
but, on the other, she recognized that the case for this kind of military 
necessity has the tendency to “unravel” over time.466  The question then 
becomes:  Should the Constitution and its related jurisprudence rely on such 
shifting foundations?  This Note argues that it should not. 
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The goal for a sounder functionalist test should be to limit the effect that 
military necessity can have on the overall balancing of the functionalist 
factors.  While there are several ways to do this, this Note advocates for one 
of two solutions.  First, the “active theater of war” dictum467 should be 
removed from the “practical obstacles” factor.  This term is loaded with the 
same military necessity concerns mentioned above and, as was the case 
with the D.C. Circuit in Al Maqaleh, can swing a functionalist analysis.468   
Alternatively, if the “active theater of war” language is to remain, it must 
be redefined, because it is unclear what Justice Kennedy meant by the term 
in the first place.469  Yet, Judge Bates’s emphasis on looking to the actual 
security and practical limitations at the detention facility itself, independent 
of the overall “active theater of war” in Afghanistan, was a step in the right 
direction.  Simply put, the availability of valuable constitutional rights 
should not turn on oblique dictum470 buried in a Supreme Court decision. 
2.  Moving Toward “Abuse or Avoidance of Process” 
A recurring concern in many of the Boumediene and Al Maqaleh 
opinions was the difficult and thorny problem of the length of a detainee’s 
detention—essentially, the abuse or avoidance of process by the executive.  
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion in Boumediene touched on such 
considerations.  There, he recognized that the detainees had been held for 
six years without any kind of judicial scrutiny.471  Justice Kennedy also 
voiced concerns about manipulation of constitutional rights by moving 
detainees away from where process could reach them.472  And Justice 
Souter also raised this concern even more pointedly in his concurrence, 
going so far as to suggest that length of detention without process should be 
an additional factor in the functionalist analysis.473  Judge Bates, picking up 
on both Justice Kennedy’s and Souter’s concerns, called the length of 
detention without adequate review an additional factor that could “shade” 
the determination of all the others.474  Even in the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in 
Al Maqaleh, which did not extend the Suspension Clause, Chief Judge 
Sentelle explicitly recognized the danger presented by an executive that 
could shield detainees from the federal courts by transferring them to active 
combat zones.475  He went on to admit that such concerns could lead to an 
additional factor.476 
In light of the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning, the Al Maqaleh detainees made 
arguments in the district court, supported by reports from The New York 
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Times and Associated Press, that the military has been shuffling detainees 
away from Guantanamo to Bagram.477  Further, these stories are only part 
of a more general policy pursued by the executive branch to keep detainees 
away from the ambit of the federal courts.478  Despite the fact that Al 
Maqaleh recently lost on this argument before Judge Bates for failure to 
present enough new evidence,479 future cases may have enough evidence to 
advance this theory.  Therefore, for a new functionalist test to be relevant in 
this climate of executive manipulation, the courts must be able to weigh in 
on and scrutinize the actions of the political branches.  As Justice Kennedy 
cautioned in Boumediene, the separation of powers principles that inform 
the Suspension Clause and the writ of habeas corpus, “must not be subject 
to manipulation by those whose power it is designed to restrain.”480  Thus, a 
new factor, one that squarely addresses concerns of executive manipulation, 
must be explicitly added to the three-factor Boumediene test.  This Note 
proposes a new fourth factor, entitled “abuse or avoidance of process.” 
Admittedly, these remedies to the functionalist three-factor test are not 
easy ones.  Chief Justice Roberts’s and Justice Scalia’s dissents in 
Boumediene481 and the D.C. Circuit’s opinion in Al Maqaleh482 provide 
powerful arguments that would caution against this change.  The threat of 
global terrorism and the need for the political branches to have adequate 
freedom to respond to that threat are pressing.  However, the need to protect 
individual rights is equally, if not more, pressing.  The Framers saw the writ 
of habeas corpus as an essential part of the common law and protected it in 
the Constitution via the Suspension Clause.483  The Framers also viewed the 
writ as one of the chief protections for individuals against the overreach of 
the government:  a “bulwark against arbitrary punishment.”484  A rule that 
ensures that the government cannot too easily sidestep the consequences of 
its actions, even when those actions are abroad, was also a major goal of 
Justice Kennedy’s Boumediene holding.485  In the hope of better preserving 
that goal, this change to the “practical obstacles” factor and the addition of 
the “abuse or avoidance of process” factor will better ensure that the 
Court’s functionalist jurisprudence does not warp into a test dominated by 
military necessity that can “switch the Constitution on or off at will.”486 
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CONCLUSION 
The D.C. Circuit’s deference to the military in its Al Maqaleh decision 
departed from the spirit of the Supreme Court’s holding in Boumediene.  
Boumedieme extended the Suspension Clause of the Constitution to 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay who were seeking to file habeas corpus 
petitions in U.S. courts.487  Justice Kennedy’s functionalist Boumediene 
test, while well-intentioned, was overly subjective and has unsurprisingly 
resulted in jurisprudential uncertainty.  The consequent schism between 
Boumediene and Al Maqaleh has effectively created two classes of War on 
Terror detainees:  detainees lucky enough to be held at Guantanamo Bay 
with access to the U.S. courts to seek release, and everyone else.488  
Further, the current formulation of the test, particularly the third factor, 
“practical obstacles,” can easily be warped by the undue influence of 
military necessity.  Drawing on the jurisprudence of cases like Milligan,489 
Korematsu,490 and Youngstown,491 this Note concludes that the Court’s 
controversial history with military necessity makes the issue not 
“susceptible of intelligent judicial appraisal.”492  As such, for the 
functionalist test to remain faithful to Justice Kennedy’s commitment to 
individual rights in Boumediene,493 the “practical obstacles” factor must be 
purged of the influence of military necessity.  Lastly, with growing concern 
about the executive’s willingness to manipulate this inequity in availability 
of habeas corpus,494 this Note recommends a new factor, “abuse or 
avoidance of process,” to ensure that Justice Kennedy’s commitment to 
separation of powers principles and individual rights, remains at the 
forefront of his functionalist test. 
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